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WHEN GOOD COURTS GO WRONG: A
CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
DOMESTIC MARITIME BOUNDARY
JURISPRUDENCE,
Gayl S. Westerman2
I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska v. United StateS3 in 2005 is the latest in a series of
federallstate maritime boundary cases that began with United
States v. California in 1965.' That case held that the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone5 would
henceforth constitute the applicable law in all disputes between
the United States and the individual states in regard to
establishing the boundaries along their joint coastlines.6 Because
the United States has yet to ratify the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 1958
Convention is the law currently in force and will be used
throughout the article as the applicable statute in any maritime
1. C 2010 by Gayl Westerman.
2. Dr. Gayl S. Westerman is a Professor of Law and Director of International
Programs at Pace Law School, White Plains, New York. She has written widely
on international law topics, particularly on international and domestic maritime
boundary delimitation, and has served as a consultant on these matters to the
states of New York, Rhode Island, Mississippi, and Alaska. Dr. Westerman
received her J.D. from Pace and her LL.M. and J.S.D. degrees from Yale Law
School.
3. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75 (2005).
4. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
5. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr.
29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, referred to hereafter as the 1958 Convention.
6. See United States v. California, supra note 4, at 165.
1
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Loyola Maritime Law Journal
boundary dispute between the United States and its individual
states.
The most interesting issues in this unique area of the law
only arise in federal states such as the United States, Germany,
Mexico, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Venezuela, Brazil and a
handful of others7 where there are in essence two sovereigns at
every point along the coast. In each case, the competition for
resources has resulted in a unique "constitutional settlement" that
has taken several forms within the individual federal states, i.e.,
awarding all resource control to the states themselves (Germany),
or to the federal government (Mexico), or to both sovereigns in a
pro-rata resource sharing scheme (Canada) or, as in the case of the
United States, a regime that offers a certain distance off-shore to
the individual states with the remainder left to the federal
government.
In the United States, the Submerged Lands Act9 and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act'o (both enacted in 1953) gave
control over the water and submerged land resources within three
miles of the baseline to each individual coastal state, except those
states whose coasts front the Gulf of Mexico. These states came
into the union with a six-mile off-shore area of control and
therefore, under the equal footing doctrine, retain that control
under the Acts. The federal government retains all rights to the
resources in the remainder of the continental shelf.
This so-called constitutional settlement was hard won. In
1945, the Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf" touched
off what has become a sixty-year struggle between the federal
government and its maritime states for jurisdiction over off-shore
resources." Prior to 1945, the states assumed that, under the
common law view expressed in cases such as Pollard's Lessee v.
Haganl3 and Martin v. Waddell,14 title to off-shore lands beneath
7. See, generally, GAYL WESTERMAN, THE JURIDIcAL BAY, Oxford University
Press 188-223 (1987).
8. See id. at 188-209.
9. Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L., No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953).
10. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953).
11. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12, 303 (Oct.2, 1945); Proclamation
No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12, 304 (Oct. 2, 1945).
12. See WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 201.
13. 44 U.S. (1 How.) 212, 228-229 (1845).
14. 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
navigable waters had passed from the King to the thirteen original
colonies and to states admitted to the Union thereafter under the
equal footing doctrine.
The federal government raised few objections to this view
until new twentieth century technologies revealed that the
submerged lands off-shore several coastal states contained oil
reserves and other potentially lucrative natural resources. At this
point, the federal government asserted national sovereignty over
the same submerged lands." In 1945, the United States brought
an original action against the State of California asking the
Supreme Court to determine whether title to these lands belonged
to California or to the United States. In 1947, the Supreme Court
answered the question definitively, holding that the United States,
as the national sovereign, possessed "paramount rights" in these
offshore areas.16 In 1950, the federal government brought identical
actions against Louisiana" and Texas, 8 with identical results,
leaving to the states only tidelands and those lands beneath inland
waters of the states.
These three cases touched off "one of the most hotly contested
political issues of the post-war decade."" Eventually, the coastal
states appealed to Congress to restore the submerged lands that
they had believed they owned before the first California case was
decided. This effort bore fruit in 1953 when the Congress passed
the Submerged Lands Act and, somewhat later in the same year,
the Outer Continental Shelf Act which, as noted, gave control over
the water and submerged land resources within three miles of
their coastlines to the maritime states with control over the
remainder of the Continental Shelf to the federal government.
Both Acts defined the coastline as the low-water mark located
where the mainland was in direct contact with the open sea as well
as the constructive coastlines located at the seaward limit of
"inland waters," a term left undefined. Concluding in the second
California case that the "baseline" established for international
purposes and the "coastline" established in the Submerged Lands
15. WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 202.
16. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 36-37 (1947).
17. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
18. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
19. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 185 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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Act must be one and the same, the Supreme Court held:
It is our opinion that we best fill our responsibility of
giving content to the words which Congress employed by
adopting the best and most workable definitions
available. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone. . .provides such definitions. This
establishes a single coastline for both the administration
of the Submerged Lands Act and the conduct of our
future international relations...
When the two statutes were enacted in 1953, the United
States claimed a three mile territorial sea and the rights of coastal
states thereafter became paramount in and under those waters.
When the territorial limit increased to twelve miles under the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention,2 1 the coastal states retained control
over the three-mile limit and federal control extended a further
nine miles from the baseline to the limit of the new territorial sea
claim. Although President Reagan declined to formally enter into
the 1982 Convention, he notified third parties through executive
order and policy statements that the United States intended to
adhere to the basic provisions of the 1982 Convention which
"generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly
balance the interests of all states."22
At the time, the emerging regime appeared to be a forward-
looking and effective way of allocating offshore resources between
the federal government and its coastal states. Unfortunately, this
has not proven to be the case, and conflicts between federal and
state interests in off-shore waters only intensified in subsequent
years.
The U.S. constitutional settlement above rests on two key
tasks: the establishment of "the baseline" from which all seaward
zones are measured and the location of "the coast." The rules for
determining the location of the baseline are clearly delineated in
20. United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 163 (1965).
21. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1245, referred to hereafter as UNCLOS or "1982 Convention." See Proclamation
No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989) extending U.S. territorial sea to twelve
miles.
22. President's Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS,
378-379 (Mar. 10, 1983).
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
the 1958 Convention and remain unchanged in UNCLOS. 23 These
rules only become controversial in the case of the various water-
crossing baselines that states are allowed to establish when inland
waters, such as rivers and bays, meet the open sea. 24 This author
has written extensively on the establishment of such baselines2 5
and will not discuss the basic topic in detail here. Rather, the
almost 50 years of federal/state litigation based on the
establishment of baselines along the coasts of the United States,
concluding with the Alaska case in 2005, is both the motivation for
and the focus of this article.
As can be the case in a common law jurisdiction in which
courts establish precedents on a case-by-case basis, the law in this
area has moved beyond the clarity of the 1958 Convention to
include a convoluted series of "tests" or "factors," which have
grown exponentially with each subsequent case and have moved
U.S. jurisprudence in this area far beyond the simplicity of the
international rules envisioned by the drafters and, indeed, by the
Supreme Court itself. These "tests" can be termed "non-
conventional" in the sense that they are not a part of the 1958 or
the 1982 Conventions. Rather they were drawn from the writings
of various scholars, many of which pre-date the 1958 Convention
itself by decades or, in some cases, hundreds of years. Special
Masters and the Court alike have adopted these tests, as if the
careful consensus reached in the 1958 Convention, and continued
unchanged in UNCLOS in 1982, had never occurred.
Many have criticized the growing complexity of this
methodology and warned that it would lead to the need for both
parties in federal/state litigation to craft arguments and provide
evidence based on these so-called tests, further embroidering the
fabric of misconception and down-right error that occurs in many
23. 1958 Convention, art. 3: Baselines; art. 4, Straight Baselines; UNCLOS,
art. 5: Normal Baselines; art. 7: Straight Baselines.
24. 1958 Convention art. 5: Internal Waters; art. 13: Mouths of Rivers; art. 7:
Bays. UNCLOS art. 8: Internal Waters; art. 9: Mouths of Rivers; art. 10: Bays.
25. GAYL WESTERMAN, The Juridical Status of the Gulf of Taranto: A Brief
Reply, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 297 (1985); GAYL WESTERMAN, THE
JURIDICAL BAY (Oxford University Press 1987); W. MICHAEL REISMAN & GAYL S.
WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION (St. Martin's Press 1992); REISMAN, ARSANJANI, WEISSNER &
WESTERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (Foundation
Press 2004).
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of the decisions themselves.2 6 The Court's 2005 decision in Alaska
v. United States is merely the latest case in point, but the trend
has been clear for many years.
In addressing the concerns presented in the introduction,
Part II of this article will argue that the Supreme Court and its
Special Masters have misapplied the rules embodied in the 1958
Convention and UNCLOS in regard to the establishment of
juridical bays, in every domestic maritime boundary case since
1965. Part III will criticize the approach taken by the Special
Master and thereafter by the Court in the Alaska case, and will
suggest the correct methodology to be applied in cases with
complex coastlines, such as the Alexander Archipelago. Part IV
will briefly suggest that U.S. policy on the use of the Straight
Baseline methodology, i.e., forbidding its use along its own coasts
while approving it for third states, is out of date and is in urgent
need of reconsideration.
The article will conclude in Part V with two important points:
One, that the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the
establishment of juridical bays along U.S. coasts has become
seriously flawed and overly complicated and must be taken back,
perhaps in the next federal/state conflict, to its roots in the 1958
Convention.
Two, that the U.S. State Department and other relevant
executive agencies must reconsider U.S. policy on the
establishment of straight baselines along its coasts. This is
important because, if conservatively applied, a new policy may
obviate the need to spend several years and hundreds of thousands
of dollars on each maritime boundary delimitation case as it comes
before the U.S. Supreme Court. Conservative use of straight
baselines by the United States and its coastal states will better
serve our national security and commercial interests while not
unduly interfering with freedom of the seas.
II. JURIDICAL BAY JURISPRUDENCE
A. BACKGROUND
A brief summary of the development of the law related to
[Vol. 86
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
coastal indentations may be helpful here. The international law of
the sea has developed over many centuries as part of the on-going
effort to fairly balance the exclusive interests of coastal states in
maximizing the water areas over which they can claim maritime
sovereignty and the inclusive interests of the community of states
in maximizing freedom of the seas for navigation, fishing,
transport, and other common uses.2 7
Within this equation, the exclusive interests of coastal states
have been seen as attaching most firmly to their "inland" or
"internal waters," i.e., lakes, rivers, and, most particularly, to bays
which lie within the coastal littoral but are also linked directly to
the open sea. These intriguing water areas were once termed inter
fauces terrae, literally "within the jaws of the land." From ancient
times forward, coastal peoples have settled near these protected
indentations because they offered an efficient transportation
system for people and goods when land roads were unsafe or non-
existent; they offered a cheap and readily accessible food supply
that could be accessed with more safety than by venturing into the
open sea or the hinterlands; and the inhabitants were able to
defend these waters from predators more easily due to their
relatively narrow openings to the sea. In fact, until relatively
recent times, these sheltered water areas contributed much more
than the land surrounding them to coastal inhabitants' basic
requirements for food, security, services, and goods.28
Throughout centuries of fluctuating international norms that
at one time favored a policy of open seas (mare liberum) and at
another time, closed (mare clausum),2 9 these indentations lying
within the land mass of a single state and variously termed bays,
gulfs, sounds, fjords, locks, firths, estuaries and the like, were
generally seen by the international community as so vitally
connected to the economic and security interests of the coastal
state as to be considered more like the land than the open sea.
Therefore, they were subject to the same absolute sovereignty that
a coastal state exercises over its land territory.
27. See WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 14-31, 181-186; and J.R.V. PRESCOTT, THE
MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 37, 39-45 (Brill Academic
Publishers 1985); See also, generally, JONATHAN CHARNEY, INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Kluwer Law International 1998).
28. See WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 32-74.
29. Id.
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Historically, coastal states have exercised wide latitude in
determining which coastal indentations could be designated as
part of their inland waters. Despite community-wide consensus,
however, every era produced opposition to what were seen as
"excessive" bay claims; and various rules were developed 3 0 that
purported to limit the extent and/or the size and/or the
configuration of bays to which the exclusive sovereignty of a given
coastal state could reasonably attach. This dialogue continued into
the twentieth century, until a historic consensus on bay claims was
reached in Article 7 of the 1958 Convention and was continued
unchanged in Article 10 of UNCLOS in 1982.31
Disputes between nation states over excessive bay claims
have virtually ceased since that time due to the wholesale
incorporation into both treaties of the language of the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) majority decision in the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case3 2 which gave states with deeply
indented coasts, or those fringed with islands in the immediate
vicinity, the right to draw straight baselines connecting the
outermost points of their exceptional coastlines and to claim all
waters landward of those baselines as internal waters. This radical
legal innovation is now used legitimately by the target states of
the provision, i.e., Norway, Sweden, and perhaps a handful of
others; but it is also used widely and, it has been argued,
promiscuously and pathologically,3 3 by states possessing neither
deeply indented coastlines nor anything remotely like fringing
islands in the immediate vicinity.34 Since the "baseline" is the
"coast" by definition, and thus the point from which all further sea
zones are measured, these states hope to move their baselines as
30. Id. at 46-47. Narrow limit rules have included the cannon shot rule, the
line of sight doctrine, and others; Id. at 51-61. These were then superseded by
rules establishing nautical mile limits on the extent of the opening to the sea, as
weapons technology made each of the prior rules obsolete.
31. See 1958 Convention, art. 7 and UNCLOS, art. 10.
32. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 1951). See
also 1958 Convention, art. 4, and UNCLOS, art. 7.
33. See WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 186-187 and notes 17 and 18
[promiscuous baselines]; see also RIESMAN & WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES,
supra note 25, at 118-120 [pathological baselines].
34. See maps in REISMAN & WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES, supra note 25, at
108-189. These excessive claims are but another example of the effort by coastal
states, obvious since the beginning of the last century, to extend control over their
coastal waters by enclosing the largest area of internal waters possible within
their baselines.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
far out to sea as possible, thus further extending the limits of their
territorial seas and contiguous zones. This effort became even
more widespread after 1982 when coastal states used the same
technique to claim exclusive state control over vastly expanded
areas of continental shelf and the newly-established exclusive
economic zone (EEZ).3 5
Because a straight baseline claim by a given nation state
subsumes the more modest indentations along the coast which the
state might previously have enclosed as bays, disputes before the
I.C.J. and other relevant international fora no longer deal with bay
determinations in the main. Rather, the I.C.J. has been required to
consider the straight baseline claims of states and the effect of
such claims on the delimitation of the continental shelf and/or the
exclusive economic zone between or among competing states.3 6
Within the United States, however, the bay dialogue has
continued unabated into the twenty-first century in the context of
federal/state maritime boundary conflicts, for two major reasons.
First, an inherent conflict between state and federal interests was
created by the nature of the constitutional settlement chosen by
the United States. Second, the United States policy which
proscribes the use of straight baselines by either the federal
government or its individual states has severely limited the bases
upon which a state can successfully claim sovereignty over its
coastal indentations.
B. U.S. JURISPRUDENCE SINCE 1958
1. THE INHERENT FEDERAL STATE CONFLICT
The implications of the coupling of the Submerged Lands Act
35. UNCLOS, art. 55-75
36. See, inter alia, Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahirya/Malta)
Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13; Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and
the French Republic (St. Pierre and Miquelon) (Can./Fr.) 95 I.L.R. 645 (1994);
(Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 1993 I.C.J. 38; Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) 2001 I.C.J.
87 (Judgment of Mar. 16); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua. v.
Colombia), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 124; Gulf of Maine (Canada v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 246; Channel Continental Shelf (U.K v. France), 18 R. Int'l Arb. Award 3
(1977), 54 I.L.R. 6 (1977); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine), Judgment 2009 I.C.J. 132; Maritime Dispute, Peru v. Chile, Judgment
Pending.
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with the new rules for bays established by the 1958 Convention
were recognized immediately by the federal government. In 1970,
shortly after the second California decision which adopted the
Convention as the law applicable to all federal/state maritime
boundary controversies, an Interagency Baseline Committee was
established within the executive branch. This federal Committee
was charged with re-evaluating the baselines then existing in light
of the new Convention and then producing a series of nautical
charts establishing the "correct" baselines for each portion of the
coast, regardless of the length of time the previous baselines had
been used and with what amount of acquiescence by the federal
government and third states. There is no doubt that the
Committee was also created to formulate the federal government's
position that would be used in federal/state maritime boundary
litigation, both existing and pending. 37 When these charts were
completed, the federal government engaged in a cynical campaign
of litigation designed to strip the states of all of the coastal
indentations considered vulnerable to attack under the newly
drawn federal baselines. Literally, every coastal state has been
involved in these challenges.3 8
In each litigation, the federal government has felt free to use
the baselines established by the federal Interagency Baseline
37. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, Supp. Materials, Vol. 1:
Appendix, No. 73-1888, Testimony of Dr. Robert D. Hodgson, Geographer, Dept.
of State, at 298, 300, 301, 307, 310, 312, 313, and 325 (October Term, 1973),
confirming that the Committee was aware of pending cases when discussions on
particular baselines relevant to these cases began. The purpose of this Committee
is made clear in Appendix F of the Coastline Committee Charter, distributed by
the Department of State on August 7, 1970. This memorandum to Members of the
LOS Task Force from the acting legal advisor to the State Department on the
subject of the "Establishment of Ad Hoc Committee on Delimitation of the U.S.
Coastline," reads in part: "This committee will review the lines recently drawn by
the Geographer of the Department of State . . . and will determine the location of
the limits of the United States territorial sea and the contiguous zone as
accurately as possible . . . . It is anticipated that the committee will arrive at a
provisional United States position .. . [that] can be used in the international and
the domestic sphere" (emphasis added). Id. at 415. For a more detailed
discussion of the knowledge by Committee members of on-going and pending
cases against the states, see infra Part III. See also WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at
224-225, notes 178 and 197.
38. Including, inter alia, Alaska: [Cook Inlet] (1975); [Norton Sound] (1992);
[Arctic Coast] (1997); [Alexander Archipelago] (2004). California, (1965 & 1966);
Florida (1975 & 1976); Louisiana: [Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case]
(1985); [Louisiana Boundary Case] (1969 & 1975); Maine: [Rhode Island & New
York Boundary Case] (1986); [Nantucket Sound] (1987).
[Vol. 810
HeinOnline -- 8 Loy. Mar. L.J. 10 2010
 ola    .  
t      s t lished    tion 
re ized iately   l r t. I  , 
l  ter   lif rnia i  i h ted  
ti     i able   /state ti  
ry i ,  t ragency line ttee  
lished t i   tive   l ttee 
 r ed t  aluating  lines  i  i ht 
  tion   cing   l 
 lishing  s  tion   
less      ious li es  
    t t i scence   l 
ent  ir  .     t  
tee  t     t's 
      t te i   
t  i   7   ts  
,  l t   i al ign 
ti    i   t s    l 
i s red le    
  .  tal t   n 
l   .38 
  r ent    
s lished   ency  
, t    .  ,  
 i   . , ,  
  , , ,   t  r , ), 
i     i g   i s  
l r s t  s   t e 
  r     
 t   t   rs  
  i  l r  t  t ent  
  is t       . . 
 : t e l    
 r t ..   i   
     
t ly ...      
l   .    i al  
i   .   
      
    ,    
    
 i , k l t} ; t n  ; 
 t] );  i elago]   
 ); :  i sippi  se] 
uisiana  se]   ; : e    
ry se] ); t t   
When Good Courts Go Wrong
Committee as benchmarks, citing to them as if these
determinations had been made by a group of objective scholars and
experts rather than a committee appointed by the federal
government itself - that is to say, one of the parties to each of the
disputes. This questionable practice has been widely adopted by
Special Masters and the Court alike, and continues unabated until
this day.
This conflict of interest between the United States and its
own states might seem to be one of form rather than of substance.
After all, we acknowledge federal supremacy in many areas of our
national life. But the context here is quite different. When two
nation states, e.g., the United States and Canada or Great Britain
and Norway, are competing for water resources in a given sea
area, each will be assumed to be acting in the best interests of its
own citizens in any litigation which may transpire. But who
decides what is in the best interest of the citizens when there are
two sovereigns along each coast, and each claims a duty to protect
the interests of the same people?
Recall that in other forms of constitutional settlement, either
there is no competition inherent in the scheme (i.e., all the rights
adhere either to the states or to the federal government), or the
federal and state governments act in common with pro-rata shares
of resources awarded to each. In the United States, however,
baseline decisions are made by the federal government, and any
opposition by the individual states must be resolved within the
context of costly federal/state litigation and ultimately decided by
the highest federal court.
2. THE U.S. POLICY ON THE USE OF STRAIGHT BASELINES
The second major reason that bay determinations remain
highly relevant in U.S. federal/state litigation today is that the
federal government has refused, as a policy matter, to utilize
straight baseline claims in establishing the coastline of the United
States. This has made it likewise impossible for individual states
to utilize straight baseline claims, regardless of how legitimate
such claims might be under the geographical guidelines
established in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case and adopted in
international treaty form in 1958.39
39. 1951 I.C.J. 116, supra note 31. The most juridically important language of
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This policy was given Court sanction in United States v.
California,4 0 the first major federal/state maritime boundary
dispute to come before the Supreme Court after the coming into
force of the 1958 Convention: "We conclude that the choice under
the Convention to use the straight base-line method for the
determining inland waters. . . is one that rests with the Federal
Government, and not with the individual states."4 1
Unfortunately, beyond federal primacy, the California Court
offers no rationale for this part of its decision, and we are left to
piece one together from two sources. First, we know that U.S.
policy has always favored narrow limits in the seas for national
security purposes, e.g., to facilitate the movement of U.S. naval
vessels as they conduct legitimate surveillance and rescue
activities or as they attempt to contest and minimize the maritime
claims of third states which are seen to interfere with U.S. military
and commercial interests. Second, we also know from documents
referenced in the immediately preceding section that the
Interagency Baseline Committee was tasked with setting new
baselines that favored federal interests. In refusing to make claims
to straight baselines under Article 4 of the 1958 Convention
themselves, the government was well aware that this would
eliminate a possible extension of state claims, as well as one
legitimate basis upon which states could establish a claim to their
traditional water areas in pending litigation between the federal
government and the states.
Part IV of this article will set forth several reasons, beyond
fundamental fairness, that U.S. policy in this area should be
reconsidered. For now, suffice it to say that regardless of rationale,
the effect of this policy has been that in the United States, the
legitimacy of every claim by an individual state to sovereignty over
Article 4 of the 1958 Convention reads as follows: 1) In localities where the
coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the
coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining
appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 2)The drawing of such baselines must
not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently
closely linked to the
land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.
40. 381 U.S. 139, supra note 4.
41. United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 168.
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the waters of a coastal indentation must rise or fall as either a
juridical bay within Article 7 of the 1958 Convention (UNCLOS,
Article1O), or as historic inland waters under no conventional
guidelines whatsoever.
Ironically, the U.S. policy on straight baselines in and of
itself might not have created too serious a problem for states had
Article 7 been applied as intended by the Convention drafters.
Recall that in 1965, the California Court held that in any
federal/state maritime boundary dispute over the nature of coastal
indentations, the applicable law in the U.S. was to be identical to
the latest statement of international law on this issue, then Article
7 of the 1958 Convention.4 2 This provision had been praised as a
clear statement of the law which could provide excellent guidance
in the making of bay determinations. But as more and more
federal/state cases have come before the Court since 1965, both the
purposes and the text of Article 7 have been systematically
misapplied. The arguments of the parties and the decisions
themselves have been corrupted by the creation and subsequent
use of several subsidiary "tests" which have no basis in the 1958
Convention and, in fact, may have been rejected by the original
drafters themselves. Litigation has become increasingly complex,
requiring more time and more money spent on both sides than is
warranted, as if the historic consensus achieved in 1958 and
preserved in 1982 had never been reached.
The time has come to take a look at these various so-called
subsidiary tests and determine whether or not they are facilitating
efficient and just results in these cases. If not, it is long past time
to discard them and return to first principles as the drafters
intended. These determinations can only be made through a
detailed re-examination of the text of Article 7 (UNCLOS,
Article10) and it's drafting history.
3. THE SUBSIDIARY TESTS
a. THE ASSIMILATION OF ISLANDS TO THE MAINLAND TEST
The first conceptual misstep in the Supreme Court's Juridical
Bay jurisprudence occurred very early on in federal/state maritime
boundary litigation when the federal Baseline Committee, special
42. See supra, note 20.
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experts, Special Masters and the Supreme Court, faced with
complex coastlines that are more the rule than the exception,
inexplicably began to consider a question not presented by the
language of Article 7 of the 1958 Convention, i.e., "Can an island
be considered a part of, or an extension of, the mainland for
juridical bay determination purposes?" If answered in the
affirmative, this only begged a further question: "If so, When?" The
answer, "[W]hen the island can be assimilated to the mainland,"
merely added a further layer of uncertainty, because surely the
next question must be, "When CAN an island be assimilated to the
mainland?" And thus the Assimilation of Islands to the Mainland
test was born, leading to a host of further conceptual errors along
the way as each successive federal/state controversy elaborated a
more unwieldy set of "factors" that must now be argued by all
parties to a controversy and therefore seriously considered by each
Special Master and the Court in turn.
The issue was first considered in United States v. Louisiana,4 3
where the Court stated, "the general understanding has been -
and under the Convention certainly remains - that bays are
indentations in the mainland, and that islands off the shore are
not headlands but at the most create multiple mouths to bays." 44
The Court continues: "We have concluded that Article 7 [of the
1958 Convention] does not encompass bays formed in part by
islands, which cannot realistically be considered part of the
mainland. Article 7 defines bays as indentations in the 'coast,' a
term which is used in contrast with 'islands' throughout the
Convention."4 5
This language from the Louisiana case has been relied upon
in every subsequent federal/state maritime boundary case.
Therefore, it seems important to review the language of Article 7
upon which the Louisiana Court purports to rely. Article 7(2) [now
10(2)] reads:
For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked
indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to
the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked waters
and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast.
43. 394 U.S. 1 (1969).
44. Id. at 62 (Emphasis in original).
45. Id. at 67.
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An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay
unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of a
semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the
mouth of that indentation.4 6
It should be immediately clear to the reader that the words
and phrases below, taken from the Louisiana decision, do not
appear in Article 7(2) above or any other section of Article 7:
* Mainland
* A part of the mainland
* Bays formed in part by islands
* Indentations in the mainland
* Indentations in the coast
* Headlands
* Islands off the "shore"
Therefore, the Louisiana Court's allegation of "general
understanding" aside, these concepts could not possibly have
"remained" as part of the drafters' understanding. In fact, the 1958
Convention's drafting history makes it quite clear that many of the
terms used by the Louisiana Court above were eschewed by the
International Law Commission in both its 195547 and its 1956
drafts.4 8 For example, the older terms headlands and inter fauces
terrae were specifically rejected 49 in favor of the more flexible term,
natural entrance points which was adopted by the full Conference
in 1958."o
Even though the drafters specifically rejected the use of
46. Supra note 5.
47. [1955] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 251.
48. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), referred hereafter as
Report of the I.L.C. (1956).
49. In phrases such as "a semi-circle drawn on the mouth of that indentation"
and "the semi-circle drawn at the entrance of that indentation," the draft
language indicates that the Commission intended to favor a more functional,
descriptive approach in identifying the entrance of an indentation. It is also clear
the drafters considered "entrance" and "mouth" as synonyms. See WESTERMAN,
supra note 7, at 113, ns. 95 and 98.
50. See U.N. Doc.A/CONF.13/C.1/1.62, in 3 United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea at 227-28 (1958).
2010]1 15
HeinOnline -- 8 Loy. Mar. L.J. 15 2010
]   r    
 ti  ll t, r,  r ed   
     rge , r r  t   
r le se r    ss  
  ti .46 
 
   iately r   r t  s 
 ses       t 
r  i le )    r   le  
•  
• t   l  
•    rt  s 
• i s    
• i s   t 
• s 
•     
,   '  tion  l 
,  ts  t i l   
   ' i .   
i 's ti         
  isi na       
ti al  i   547  
fts.48    l s   
e  ll  t       l i l  t r , 
l e       
 .50 
   lly te    
  
   y.    
i l i    
. .   . N3  ),  t r  
  
   
ir le      
  i i  i t  t  f r  r  f ti l, 
      r 
r  . , 
a    
. .N . 13/ . 1 1.62,   
  
Loyola Maritime Law Journal
headlands, the term is frequently used by commentators5' and by
Courts to this day, often as a synonym for natural entrance points.
This continued use has led to more troubling conceptual missteps
because the term natural entrance points was intended by the
drafters to refer to a much wider, more functional concept which
may include traditional headlands as a subcategory but which also
includes any number of other features, such as harbor works and
other artificial structures which, under Article 8 of the 1958
Convention, are regarded as forming natural entrance points for
bays. The I.L.C. Commentary goes further to say that permanent
structures erected on the coast (e.g., jettisons, protecting walls,
and dykes) are considered a part of harbor works for delimitation
purposes. As long as these features clearly mark an entrance into
the indentation, they create natural entrance points under Article
7.52
Much more important for our analytical purposes here, there
is also no doubt whatsoever that the drafters envisioned islands as
serving as natural entrance points and, in fact, as sometimes
creating the indentations themselves. The first part of the drafters'
intention is made clear in Article 7(3), which sets forth the general
measurement rule for bays in its first sentence, "For the purpose of
measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between the
low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line
joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points."53
Referring back to the semi-circle test established in Article
7(2), the second sentence of Article 7(3) clarifies the methodology
to be used when islands create separate mouths or entrances54 into
a bay:
Where, because of the presence of islands, an
indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle
51. See for example A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES, Coast and
Geodetic Survey, U.S. Government Printing Office (1962) at 63-64.
52. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954). See also [1954] 1 Y. B.
Int'l. L. Comm'n at 88-89; [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l. L. Comm'n at 74; [1956] 1 Y.B. Int'l.
L. Comm'n at 193; 3 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1958) at
142.
53. Article 7(3), sentence one, 1958 Convention (emphasis added).
54. Recall that the terms "mouths" and "entrances" are used interchangeably
by the 1958 Convention drafters in describing the location of natural entrance
points.
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shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the
lengths of the lines across the different mouths. Islands
within an indentation shall be included as if they were
part of the water area of the indentation.5 5
It is important to note that in measuring the water area of a
single-mouthed indentation for comparison with that of the semi-
circle, as required by Article 7(2), one simply draws a line between
the natural entrance points of the indentation and uses the length
of that line as the diameter of a semi-circle, whose area must then
be compared with the water area of the indentation itself. When
islands create more than one mouth, however, the rule is clarified
in sentence two. Here, when computing the length of the line to be
used as the diameter of the semi-circle, only the combined length
of the lines between the islands shall be used. Further, when one
understands that any islands within the indentation (i.e.,
landward of the closing lines) shall be included as part of the
water area measurement, it is clear that Article 7 was intended to
offer a decided advantage to states whose coastlines include
indentations which, because of the presence of islands, have more
than one entrance and, therefore, more than two natural entrance
points. 5 6
This was an advantage expressly intended by the drafters, as
the legislative history of these special rules makes clear. All I.L.C.
drafts of Article 7 from 1953 forward include these measurement
rules for multi-mouthed indentations, and all versions are stated
in mandatory terms, exactly as does the final version in the 1958
Convention.
The Commentary which accompanied both the 1955 and the
1956 drafts went even further, indicating that the drafters not only
sought to create a special regime for islands that create multiple
mouths into an indentation, but much more radically, they
recognized that these islands could actually create the
indentations themselves. The 1955 Commentary to Article 7(3)
reads:
If, as a result of the presence of islands, an indentation
55. Article 7(3), sentence two, 1958 Convention (emphasis added).
56. See WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 94, 129.
57. Id. at 121-126.
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which has to be established as a bay has more than one
entrance, the sum total of the length of the different
entrances will be regarded as the length of the bay.
Here, the Commission's intention was to indicate
that the presence of islands at the entrance to an
indentation links it [the indentation] more closely
with the territory, which may justify some
alteration of the proportion between the length
and depth of the indentation. In such a case, an
indentation, which without islands at its entrance
would not fulfill the necessary conditions, is to be
recognized as a bay."
The 1956 Commentary changes very little of substance. If
anything, the drafters' intentions are made even more explicit:
[H]ere, the Commission's intention was to indicate that
the presence of islands. . . tends to link it [the
indentation] more closely to the mainland, and this
consideration may justify some alteration in the ratio
between the width and the penetration of the
indentation. In such cases an indentation which, if
it had no islands at its mouth, would not fulfill the
necessary conditions, is to be recognized as a
bay.59
Several intentions are clarified by the legislative history
above:
1. It is obvious that the International Law Commission
considered islands to be one of many coastal features that
may form natural entrance points into an indentation
under Article 7 (UNCLOS, Article1O), making any
consideration of whether or not islands can be seen as
creating the headlands of a bay or as being a part of the
mainland or as assimilated to the mainland, as has been
done from the Louisiana case forward, completely absurd.
2. The Commission also made clear that the presence of
islands which form separate entrances into an indentation
58. [1955] 2 Y.B. Int'l. L. Comm'n at 37 (emphasis added). Note again the use
of mouth and entrance as interchangeable terms.
59. [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l. L. Comm'n at 269 (emphasis added).
18 [Vol. 8
HeinOnline -- 8 Loy. Mar. L.J. 18 2010
 ola  l .  
i   t   t lished      e 
,      th   rent 
trances ill  r ed   th f   
,  ion's     
e     
  e tion]  l sely 
it   i , h   e 
f t een th 
 f  ,  
 it ut lan s  
ld ill ssar  ,   
ized   ,58 
  s    .  
 '       
,  's   t  t 
   lands. .     
t tion]        
tion  if   ti     
    r tion  
.  s , f 
 la  ld l  
sar  ,   ed  
bay,59 
  i   i   
 
    i l  i n 
red     l s t 
l e  i  
   , ticle 10),   
tion     
i  l nds t  
i l d  i ilated i land,   
  t ly  
 i  r e  
  t    
. '   asis ).   
 l   
. t'  hasis ded). 
When Good Courts Go Wrong
renders the indentation even more landlocked and well-
marked than one whose axis is completely open to the sea.
This geographic fact justifies a move away from the strict
application of the semi-circle test imposed in Article 7(2),
and towards that required by the second sentence of
Article 7(3). By design, this alteration offers distinct
advantages to a coastal state rather than creating merely
special circumstances that can only diminish the state's
chances of succeeding in a juridical bay claim.
3. Perhaps most importantly, the Commission's use of the
imperative in both their 1955 and 1956 Commentaries, as
well as in the resulting text of the Convention, is an
indication of their clear intention to create a special
regime for these islands, so much so that, an indentation,
which without the presence of islands would not meet the
necessary conditions, nonetheless is to be recognized as a
bay. This of course renders the oft-heard arguments that:
1) a juridical bay can only exist if there is a recognizable
indentation into the mainland or into the coast, or 2) that
an indention can only gain bay status if the island can be
assimilated to the mainland, likewise absurd.
Far from ignoring islands as some commentators have
suggested," the Committee of Experts, the International Law
Commission, and the First Committee of the full Conference each
expressly adopted rules which grant special standing to these bay-
related islands. The mandatory language of Article 7 itself
(UNCLOS, Article10) requires us to consider indentations created
in whole or part by islands as even more closely tied to the land
regime and therefore as triggering a special relaxation in the
aerial and geographical requirements for a bay. The drafters had
no problem whatsoever in seeing that in certain situations, such as
New York's Long Island Sound, an island may have the legal effect
of creating the juridical bay itself.
One might think that upon careful reading of the drafts and
commentaries, it would be difficult to ignore a geographical feature
that has been given such profound juridical significance. Many,
60. See D. BOWETT, THE LEGAL REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw at 30
(Oceania Publications 1979), in which Bowett, citing to the same 1955 and 1956
Commentaries as well as the language of Article 7, concludes that "[iun effect,
islands are ignored for the purposes of Article 7."
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Loyola Maritime Law Journal
however, have done just that. The Special Master's Report in the
Rhode Island/New York Boundary case points to the same ILC
Commentaries detailed above and reaches a conclusion at odds
with the clear language of those Commentaries:
New York argues that the clear indication of such
language is that islands may be used to form part of a
bay. A review of the Summary Records of the ILC for
1955 and 1956 indicates that this language addresses
the problem created by the presence of islands in the
mouth of a bay... Except for the indication that the
drafters of the Convention took islands into account in
one situation, the language is inapposite to the question
of whether islands can be treated as part of the
mainland to form an indentation."
The three major misconceptions in this one excerpt alone
reveal that the Special Master has become a captive of the special
tests and factors created by his predecessors.
First, he reads the same Commentaries as referring to the
problem created by islands, whereas such islands are among the
most common geologic features to be found along a natural
coastline, especially near coastal indentations.
Second, he misconstrues these islands as lying in the mouth
of a bay. This is a basic error made consistently by many
commentators, 2 who apparently believe that Article 7(3) only
refers to islands that line up precisely between mainland
headlands. These commentators often provide diagrams which
then are repeated by others over the years. Not only does this
misconstruction not reflect reality in nature, it is not at all
indicated in the text, which refers only to islands that create more
than one mouth into an indentation.
Third, and perhaps unnecessarily at this point, it must be
stressed that this part of the mainland language was never a part
of the drafters' "understandings" nor did it become a part of the
Convention text. Perhaps the Special Master believed that when
the International Law Commission used the imperative to state
61. October Term 1983 Report of Special Master No. 35 Original at 34, n. 23.
62. See WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 137-149; See also infra the text and
illustration accompanying notes 154-159.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
that when an indentation is created by one or several islands, even
if without the islands there would be no such designation, the
indentation is to be recognized as a bay, the drafters intended such
treatment to be optional. More likely, however, the Special Master
had become so convinced that the assimilation of islands to the
mainland test was the applicable rule of law, he no longer felt it
necessary to return to the Convention itself.
Fortunately for New York, the Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that even though Long Island Sound was created by the
off-shore presence of Long Island, the Sound could nonetheless be
considered a juridical bay. The victory is pyrrhic, however, because
in reaching this conclusion, the Rhode Island/New York Court
based its conclusion not on the actual language of the provision nor
on its drafting history, but rather on the heavily labored analysis
of subsidiary factors that allowed Long Island to be seen as a part
of the mainland and, therefore, assimilated to it.6 3
b OTHER SPECIAL FACTORS FLOWING FROM THE
ASSIMILATION TEST
If the drafters made all of this is so clear, one might ask why
the case law in federal/state maritime boundary cases, almost all
of which have involved islands, has gone so far off the analytical
path that the drafters, the text of the 1958 Convention, and in fact
the Court in the second California case, intended? It would appear
that once the Supreme Court in the Louisiana case adopted many
of the tests created by the federal Baseline Committee, our
common law system took it from there, doing what in most cases it
does best, i.e., taking each case and elaborating the reasons for a
decision based on the line of reasoning in the last case.
63. The decision was not as positive for Rhode Island because the Supreme
Court accepted the Federal Baseline Committee's recommendation that the
closing line of the bay should run from Montauk Point on Long Island to Watch
Hill Point in Rhode Island rather than obey the mandatory language of Article
7(3) of the Geneva Convention, second sentence, which requires that in the case of
islands which create more than one mouth into an indentation, a closing line
shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the
lines across the different mouths. If that mandatory language had been
followed, the closing line between Montauk Point and Block Island and continued
between Block Island and Pt. Judith, Rhode Island, would have enclosed a bay
that met the semi-circle test as well as the closing line limit of 24 miles stipulated
in Article 7(4). It would also have enclosed the waters of Block Island Sound in its
entirety.
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Acknowledging first that, "no language in Article 7 or
elsewhere positively excludes all islands from the meaning of the
'natural entrance points to a bay,"64 the Louisiana Court
nonetheless elaborates a "special circumstances" analysis to serve
as a guide for all further litigations:
[W]hile there is little objective guidance on this question
to be found in international law, the question whether a
particular island is to be treated as part of the mainland
would depend on such factors as its size, its distance
from the mainland, and the depth and utility of the
intervening waters, the shape of the island, and its
relationship to the configuration or curvature of the
coast. We leave to the Special Master the task of
determining in the first instance - in the light of these
and any other relevant criteria and any evidence he
finds it helpful to consider - whether the islands which
Louisiana has designated as headlands of bays are so
integrally related to the mainland that they are
realistically parts of the "coast" . . .65
In another part of the opinion, the Court indicates that an
island's origin and its resultant connection with the shore is
another factor to consider. 66
Following the Louisiana Court's direction, Special Master
Armstrong 7 considered the Court's so-called "factors" in his
analysis and concluded:
Applying the tests outlined by the Court. . ., neither the
size, distance from the mainland, depth and utility of the
intervening waters, shape of the low-water elevations, or
their relationship to the configuration or curvature of
64. 394 U.S. at 61.
65. Id. at 66. Even though the Court appears to understand the implications of
the Convention's natural entrance points language, in developing their special
circumstance approach they return to the old terms that had been specifically
rejected by the Convention drafters, e.g. headlands and mainlands, that are now
going to find their permanent place in all subsequent U.S. juridical bay
jurisprudence.
66. Id. at 65 n.84.
67. Report of the Special Master of July 31, 1974, at 20-21, in No. 9, Orig.,
United States v. Louisiana, approved, 420 U.S. 529 (1975).
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
the coast indicate that they should be assimilated to and
treated as a part of the mainland. While it is true that
the Court leaves open the possibility of considering other
relevant criteria and states that the list given is
intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, this
appears to be intended to leave open the question of
whether islands or low-water elevations which meet the
five suggested specific criteria may nevertheless be so
assimilated. .68
Subsequent cases have rigorously applied the same "factors"
and, due to the "special circumstances" of each case, have added
more of their own, which will be elaborated in the discussion of the
Alaska case below. By the time Alaska v. United States was filed,
the attorneys for the United States and those representing Alaska
were compelled to cover each and every one of these cumulative
factors in detail. The highly regarded Special Master in the Alaska
case, Gregory E. Maggs, was perforce required to analyze each of
the arguments of the parties based on these factors. His juridical
bay analysis alone accounts for almost one hundred pages of his
Special Master's Report.
PART III. THE ALEXANDER ARCHIPELAGO
A. THE FLAWED ANALYSIS IN ALASKA V. UNITED STATES
On June 12, 2000, the Supreme Court granted the State of
Alaska leave to file a bill of complaint to quiet title relating to
certain submerged lands in Southeast Alaska. The first issue
concerned the submerged lands underlying the waters of the
Alexander Archipelago and the second, the submerged lands
underlying the waters of Glacier Bay. Only the dispute concerning
the Alexander Archipelago will be treated here.
Alaska claimed title to these submerged lands under two
theories:
1. The waters therein constitute historic inland waters of the
United States; or in the alternative,
68. Id. at 35-37.
69. The Alaska case was filed in 1999 and the Special Master was appointed in
2000. The Report of the Special Master Gregory E. Maggs was received and
ordered filed with the Court April 26, 2004. See juridical bay analysis at 140-226.
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Loyola Maritime Law Journal
2. The waters constitute two juridical bays.
The two lines of analysis often intersect due to misapplication
of one theory or another by the parties and/or the Special Master.
Under either theory, however, the enclosed waters would
constitute internal waters and, therefore, be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the State of Alaska. This section will focus
exclusively on the juridical bay analysis of Special Master Maggs
because the Master's Report constitutes the latest compilation of
the non-conventional tests and factors that, he believes, must be
applied in order to resolve juridical bay issues.
It is understood from the way in which the Special Master
frames the issues that the assimilation of islands test has become a
threshold issue that must be resolved in order to reach the real
issue - whether or not Alaska's juridical bay claims conform to
Article 7. According to the Special Master's Report:
The parties agree that Alaska must prevail on two
general issues to establish the alleged juridical bays.
The first issue is whether numerous islands in the
Alexander Archipelago can be "assimilated" to each
other or to the mainland to form the sides of the alleged
juridical bays. The second issue is whether the alleged
juridical bays, if formed by the assimilation of islands,
meet the requirements stated in Article 7 of the
Convention.70
Perhaps reflecting on the complex task put before him,
Special Master Maggs continues:
The United States and Alaska have based their
competing arguments on information contained in
surveys, charts, publications, affidavits, and other
documents. They do not dispute the authenticity of these
documents or what they say. Almost all the parties'
disagreements concern legal standards or the
application of the law to facts... In these circumstances,
a trial would not aid resolution of this matter. As one
counsel put it at oral argument, "The Master has a
phenomenal amount of evidence in front of him that the
70. Id. at 140.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
parties have been able to collect . . . I'm afraid that if you
had a trial you would hear more. . . "
1. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN PRIOR CASES
The Special Master began his assimilation analysis by
reviewing "Factors Considered in Prior Cases."72 Citing the
language of the Louisiana case discussed in detail above, the
Master stated that the question of whether a particular island is to
be treated as a part of the mainland would depend on such factors
as its size, its distance from the mainland, the depth and utility of
the intervening waters, the shape of the island, and its
relationship to the configuration or curvature of the coast, as well
as the island's origin and resulting connection with the shore.
The Special Master then turned to the precedents found in
the Louisiana case,74 the Rhode Island and New York Boundary
case,75 and the United States v. Florida case.76 In his discussion of
the New York case, it appears that a further set of factors may
have been added to the Louisiana list through a series of
exceptions filed by the United States and a list of "points" cited as
being important to the Rhode Island/New York Court's finding
that Long Island could be assimilated to the mainland. The Special
Master stated:
The United States filed exceptions to Special Master
Hoffman's Report... [arguing] that islands should be
treated as headlands only... when the island is
separated from the mainland by a genuine "river"; when
the island is connected to the mainland by a low-tide
elevation; or when, as in the Louisiana Boundary Case,
the shoreline is deltaic in nature.
Special Master Maggs noted that the Rhode Island/New York
Court nominally rejected the federal government's factors, saying
that each case must be considered individually in terms of the
71. Id. at 141.
72. Id. at 148.
73. Id. at 149.
74. Id. at 149-150.
75. Id. at 150-151.
76. Id. at 152.
77. See 469 U.S. at 517 and 2003 Alaska Spec. Master's Report at 151.
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assimilation test. 8 But he noted further that the Court, in its own
case-by-case analysis of Long Island, emphasized the following
points in reaching its conclusion. Whether these points constitute
merely an expansion of the Louisiana factors or constitute
additional tests, the language below has undoubtedly made its way
into subsequent cases:
(1) Long Island and the mainland almost completely
surround the water in Long Island Sound, creating a
"pocket of water;"
(2) The western end of Long Island, closest to New York
City, "helps form an integral part of the familiar
outline of New York Harbor;"
(3) The East River, which separates Long Island from
Manhattan, "before dredging" had a shallow depth of
15 to 18 feet and a dangerous current;
(4) The size of the East River in terms of width and depth
was very small in comparison with the 118-mile length
of Long Island Sound;
(5) Long Island and the adjacent shore shared a common
"geological history," formed by deposits and sediments
brought by sheets of ice 25,000 years ago;
(6) Long Island Sound is not a route of international
passage... ships traveling between points north and
south of Long Island Sound typically pass Long Island
on its seaward side."
Special Master Maggs also pointed to United States v. Florida
in which Special Master Maris reasonedso that the Florida Keys
below the Moser Channel should not be assimilated to the Florida
Keys above the Moser Channel, based on the non-navigability of
the Channel itself. Special Master Maris went on to say that the
upper Florida Keys were eligible for assimilation in an area of
"very shallow water which is not readily navigable and nearly all
of which is dotted with small islands and low-tide elevations."81
78. Special Master's Report at 151.
79. 469 U.S. at 518 and 2003 Spec. Master's Report at 151.
80. United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976); see also 2003 Alaska Spec.
Master's Report at 152.
81. Florida, 425 U.S. at 791.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
The Court in the Florida case did not rule on this issue, but the
navigability of the so-called intervening waters was added to the
list of special factors that Special Master Maggs felt compelled to
take into consideration in his analysis of Alaska's claims.
1. THE ANALYSIS OF SPECIAL FACTORS IN THE ALEXANDER
ARCHIPELAGO
Alaska claimed four indentations as Juridical Bays: North
Bay, South Bay, Sitka Sound, and Cordova Bay." The Special
Master began his factual summary by focusing on the size of four
indentations themselves. * Prior cases have looked at the size of
the islands as relevant to the assimilation issue, but the absolute
size of the water area has appeared as a factor only in the series of
exceptions filed by the United States in the Rhode Island/New
York Case. 84 These were not accepted by the Special Master or the
Court in that case, but it would seem that any factor mentioned in
passing became part of a juridical bay analysis, regardless of its
relevance to Article 7 which only treats the size of the water area
when applying the semi-circle test in Article 7(2).
A reader's impression of the sheer size of these indentations
and some of the comparisons made with land areas in the United
States have little to do with the issues. To illustrate but a few of
these comparative measurements:
North Bay and South Bay are extremely large. North
Bay has an area of 5,593 square nautical miles and its
mouth... is 154 nautical miles wide. South Bay has an
area of 4,949 square nautical miles, and its mouth.. . is
120 nautical miles wide. . 8 5 To give some sense of the
scale of these immense bodies of water, the entire State
of Connecticut has an area of only 5,544 square miles or
4,186 square nautical miles; Connecticut is thus smaller
than either North Bay or South Bay... 86 [W]ith an area
of 2,231 square miles, [Cordova Bay] exceeds both
82. See maps, Appendices D and E, October Term 2003 Spec. Master's Report.
83. Id. at 142.
84. See supra note 80, at 27-28.
85. Id. at 143.
86. Id. at 143. The confusion is made further apparent by the claim that the
State of Connecticut has a land area that can be expressed in "nautical miles."
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Delaware and Rhode Island in size.8 7
The same curious comparisons are made again when the
Master moves on to the size of the islands themselves: Kuiu Island
is long and narrow... [and] has an area of 745 square miles,
making it the 15th largest island in the United States and roughly
a dozen times the size of the District of Columbia... Kupreanof
Island... has an area of 1,089 square miles, making it the 12th
largest island in the United States and giving it roughly the same
land area as the state of Rhode Island.88
Although it has been the practice of each Special Master to
elucidate one or more new tests for bay determination, one can
only hope that comparing the size of claimed indentations and/or
islands to the size of various smallish U.S. states will not catch on.
The Special Master repeats several other misconceptions in
his summary, one of the most egregious being that inherited from
Louisiana: "[B]ays typically are indentations of water into
unbroken land masses. North and South Bay do not fit this usual
pattern."89 Presumably, these waters fail to "fit" because they are
made up, in part, by islands. As discussed at great length above,9 0
the drafters expressly acknowledged that even along coasts
without an obvious indentation, a bay can be formed by the
presence of islands themselves; that islands can obviously serve as
entrance points into an indentation; and most importantly, that
indentations that without the presence of islands might not be
considered as bays, are to be so considered under Article 7(3).
By stating a non-rule at the outset and then treating the
indentations at issue as special circumstances needing special
rules, the Master once again sets in motion the flawed analysis
that has plagued all the previous federal-state boundary cases,
starting of course with the question of whether a given island can
be assimilated to the mainland. Before he engaged in his own
assimilation analysis of the Alexander Archipelago, the Special
Master cited prior case law91 as the source for the ever-growing list
of special factors that have become embedded in bay jurisprudence
87. Id. at 146.
88. Id. at 143-44.
89. Id. at 143.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 43-60.
91. Master's Report at 148-53.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
in the United States. The first factor, the identity of the
intervening waters, should be discussed in some detail because it
appears that Master Maggs understood the factor to be a threshold
test which must be satisfied before proceeding to an analysis of the
assimilation to the mainland test.
a. THE IDENTITY OF THE INTERVENING WATERS
Alaska and the United States could not agree as to the
meaning of the term intervening waters. Alaska put forward the
argument that intervening waters between two land forms should
include only the waters that are pinched, where the opposing land
forms in fact come together creating an assimilation zone. The
government argued that intervening waters should include "the
entire area across which the two land forms of interest face one
another."9 2
Both definitions require extensive geographic and
hydrographic measurement. In a geographical setting as complex
as the Alexander Archipelago with over a thousand islands facing
off against both island and mainland land masses, such an
endeavor would appear to be impossible, even if relevant.
Nevertheless, some measurement was in fact gamely attempted
here. There is mention of the length and width of some of the
water areas measured in nautical miles, or yards, or even more
confusingly, in some places in meters, without any discussion of
the relevance of these measurements in the larger analysis under
Article 7. 93 What is the merit in knowing these measurements? If
the water area under study is very wide and/or long or perhaps
narrow and/or short, or if it lies between one land mass directly
facing another or is somewhat skewed, or if it lies between the
closest points of intersection of the land, what insight can we
derive as to whether or not the water areas can be enclosed as
internal waters?
The Special Master himself appeared to be unconvinced as to
the utility of this kind of analysis, noting that neither the Rhode
Island/New York Court nor the Louisiana Court offered "any
definition of intervening waters."9 4 The Special Master complained
92. Id.
93. Id. at 153-55.
94. Id. at 154.
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that the New York Court held that "assimilation depend[ed] on the
'intervening waters' [yet the Court] did not qualify these words in
any way.""s He later suggested that "uncertainty of this kind
surely will burden the Court in further coastal litigation."9 6
Despite these misgivings as to whether or not a valid
determination of intervening waters can be made in current or
subsequent cases, Master Maggs felt compelled to make a
determination in order to move forward in his analysis. As he
pointed out: "The question here is only how to define the
intervening waters to permit individual consideration of the
numerous factors identified in the Court's precedents."97 Noting
that "Alaska offers no principles for deciding what to consider and
what not to consider,"98 Master Maggs adopted the U.S. position
for three stated reasons:
a. The United States' position has greater certainty
because it offers an objective method for delimiting
intervening waters;
b. The uncertainty inherent in Alaska's approach could
make identification of the "intervening waters" highly
manipulable; and,
c. Alaska's approach would make assimilation
95. Id. at 160.
96. Id. To this observation, one can only reply, "It already has." This
uncertainty is well-illustrated in the Master's Report at 177-78, when he attempts
to apply the tests proposed by the United States to identify the "intervening
waters" in the Alexander Archipelago. Using the Hodgson and Alexander 45-
degree test discussed infra to establish the precise area of Keku Strait that can be
defined as "intervening waters," along with the 3-to-1 ratio test that Hodgson
and Alexander proposed for determining its "average width," the Master observes
that the documents submitted by the parties, despite all the supposed "certainty"
that can be provided by the use of such extra-conventional tests, still do not
establish either the relevant area of Keku Strait nor its average width "with
precision." Id. at 178. The U.S. and Alaska used different tidal levels for their
areal measurements; and even though, as Alaska correctly argued, low water is
the correct basis for measurement, it appears that "neither the United States nor
Alaska has measured the low tide area of Keku Strait." Id. Seemingly frustrated
by this failure of the parties to produce reliable information upon which he can
make a decision, the Special Master appears to say, oh well, "[E]ven without a
precise measurement, the average distance between the two islands clearly
exceeds the distances between opposing land forms where the Court has
previously recognized assimilation." Id. at 179.
97. Id. at 159.
98. Id. at 155.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
substantially easier."
Not one of these points is valid, but point b. is the most easily
and briefly refuted. The Special Master stated that the new terms
advanced by Alaska would not be particularly helpful in
identifying intervening waters. The two reasons given for rejecting
these terms, however, have little to do with the "uncertainty" of
Alaska's approach. The first reason, that adopting Alaska's
arguments might alter the assimilation analysis under the factors
identified in the Louisiana and Rhode Island/New York cases, is
unsupported; but it is also unwarranted because, as the New York
Court itself held, each case must be analyzed individually for
assimilation purposes.100
The second reason stated, that the "United States rightly may
worry that foreign nations could exploit the uncertainty in arguing
for assimilation of islands that are not 'realistically' parts of other
land forms,"o1 is simply out of date in the twenty-first century.
Citing as authority the Louisiana case decided 40 years ago,102
Master Maggs continued to invoke the argument made in many of
the early cases by Special Masters and the Court alike, that what
is done in U.S. federal/state bay litigation will influence our
relations with other nation states. The Master alludes to the same
misconception earlier when he says, ". . .given that assimilation of
islands may affect international borders, a vague standard may
invite undesirable international controversies." 0 3
However true these statements may have been in 1958, they
are no longer so. In the rest of the world, juridical bay delimitation
is basically a thing of the past due to the widespread usage of
straight baselines to delimit coasts under Article 4 of the 1958
Convention (UNCLOS, Article7). Straight baselines subsume
smaller coastal indentations, thereby fossilizing "bay"
determinations almost entirely at the international level, where
I.C.J. maritime boundary decisions now deal exclusively with
establishing single maritime boundary lines delimiting the
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone between and among
99. Id. at 154-55.
100. 469 U.S. at 517.
101. Id. at 158.
102. United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 1 (1969).
103. Master's Report at 155.
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states. 10 4 By not adopting the straight baseline regime for the
United States, the federal government has guaranteed continued
bay delimitation work for lawyers and experts in federal/state
conflicts for the foreseeable future, but we should have no fear that
what we do here will influence international law of the sea
jurisprudence as to juridical bays. Even shortly after the 1958
Geneva Convention came into force, when U.S. baseline policy
might have stirred "international controversy," the U.S.
"assimilation of islands" test was never used internationally or by
other nation states.
As to the Master's first rationale for adopting the U.S.
approach at point a, the government had proposed using an
objective test, i.e., the "45-degree test," to identify intervening
waters, thus supposedly providing more certainty than the
approach proposed by Alaska. The Special Master summarizes the
test briefly: "[T]he open sea ends and an inlet begins, when the
shores of the two land forms bend more than 45 degrees away from
the sea and toward each other."'o5 The Master credits this test to
the English geographer P. Beazley' 06 and to two U.S. State
Department geographers, Robert Hodgson and Lewis Alexander. 0 7
There are two major problems associated with the Master's
reliance on this extra-conventional test as a methodology for
locating intervening waters in the Alexander Archipelago. First,
the test was never intended to be used to replace or even to
supplement the clear guidelines established under Article 7 which
require locating the natural entrance points of an indentation. As
the term implies, most natural entrance points are natural, as in
easily identifiable, and thus easily established without the aid of
additional tests in all but the most special circumstances. Two of
these special circumstances arise when an indentation with one
easily identifiable entrance point on one side of an entrance faces a
gently sloping coastline on the other and when one easily
104. For the I.C.J.'s most recent decision in this area, see Case Concerning
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), I.C.J. Judgment 3
February 2009.
105. Master's Report at 155.
106. P. Beazley, Maritime Limits and Baselines: A Guide to their Delineation
(The Hydrographic Society, Special Publication No. 2, pp. 16-17 (1977).
107. Robert D. Hodgson and Lewis M. Alexander, Towards an Objective Analysis
of Special Circumstances: Bays, Rivers, Coastal and Oceanic Archipelagos and
Atolls (Law of the Sea Institute Occasional Paper No. 13, pp. 10-12, Apr. 1972).
32 [Vol. 8
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
identifiable entrance point faces a completely featureless coastline
on the other.10s
The Supreme Court has recognized that where there is no
readily identifiable natural entrance point, an objective test may
be employed to locate one. In 1966, in its Supplemental Decree in
the California case, the Court approved the use of one of these
objective tests, the so-called "bisector of the angle test"109 for
locating an entrance point on a gently sloping coastline.
Figure 1. Bisector method for deriving a natural entrance
point on a gently sloping coastline.
In so doing, the Court makes clear that extraneous tests are
not to be used when the natural entrance points of an indentation
can be identified:
In drawing a closing line across the entrance of any body
of inland water having pronounced headlands [sic],
the line shall be drawn between the points where the
108. Illustrations for these configurations, i.e. figures 2 and 3 below can be
found in both Beazley's (see supra note 105, at 17) and Hodgson and Alexander's
cited works (see supra note 106, at 10-12). See also WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at
115-17.
109. Several commentators proposed the bisector of the angle test for special
circumstances. See, e.g., Hodgson and Alexander, supra note 106, at 10-12.
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plane of mean lower low water meets the outermost
extension of the headlands. Where there is no
pronounced headland, the line shall be drawn to the
point where the line of mean lower low water on the
shore is intersected by the bisector of the angle formed
where a line projecting the general trend of the line of
mean lower low water along the open coast meets a line
projecting the general trend of the line of mean lower
low water along the tributary waterway. 110
In the second special circumstance noted above, where a
definable entrance point on one side of an indentation faces a
featureless coastline on the other side, the "45-degree test"
proposed by Hodgson and Alexander, Beazley, and others has been
sometimes used as a way to locate a natural entrance point where,
as the Supreme Court says above, no pronounced entrance point
can be found on the other side of the indentation.
Figure 2. 450 method for deriving a natural entrance point
on featureless coastline.
Although Hodgson and Alexander had long argued that the
45-degree test would provide a more objective method for
determining all headlands for bays, it was not the intent of the
drafters of Article 7 to put the burden of additional geometric
measurement on coastal states beyond the semi-circle test, except
110. United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448, 518-519 (1966).
[Vol. 834
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in extraordinary circumstances. Unfortunately, both the clear
intention of the drafters and the clear statement of the Court, set
forth immediately above, have been eroded by subsequent
decisions that may - or may not - have approved the use of the 45-
degree test in more general circumstances.
In one of the more troubling sections of his Report, Special
Master Maggs addresses the claim of the federal government that
the 45-degree test was used by the Rhode Island/New York Court
for some purposes, but the section of the case quoted immediately
thereafter includes only a brief description of the test and is cited
directly to Beazley rather than the Court."' Continuing, the
Master states that although the Court has applied the 45-degree
test to delimit bays, it has not used the test for identifying
intervening waters, again without a citation to the Rhode
Island/New York case itself. Pointing out, however, that Hodgson
and Alexander "specifically advocate using the test for this
purpose,"112 the Master then cites directly to these geographers for
the proposition that the closing lines on each end of intervening
waters "would of course be determined by the application of the 45-
degree test as in the bay situation."1 13 At no point does Master
Maggs cite language of the Rhode Island/New York Court itself to
support the contention that the Court has specifically approved the
use of the 45-degree test generally for either bay delimitation or
for the identification of intervening waters. Rather, Master Maggs
states that Hodgson and Alexander's recommendation deserves
weight "because the Court relied generally on their paper to
define the headlands [sic] of a bay." 114
This is circular reasoning of the first order. The Special
Master appears to acknowledge that the Rhode Island/New York
Court did not specifically approve the use of the 45-degree test to
define intervening waters, but they did define the test quoting
from the work of Beazley and Hodgson and Alexander; and
because Hodgson and Alexander recommend the use of the test in
all instances, the Court must have agreed because they "relied
generally" on Hodgson and Alexander's paper at trial.
111. Master's Report at 156.
112. Id. at 157.
113. Id. (citing to Hodgson and Alexander, supra note 106, at 17).
114. Master's Report at 157 (emphasis added).
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Naturally, this flawed reasoning is opposed by Alaska which
contends that the Rhode Island/New York Court did not attempt
to use the 45-degree test to define intervening waters. The Special
Master himself appears to agree later in the Report when he states
that, at bottom, he does not believe that the Rhode Island/New
York Court meant to establish a test for this purpose, having said
merely that assimilation depends on the "intervening waters,"
without qualifying these words in any way."11
What is perhaps most curious is that the Special Master
chose the U.S. approach originally on the basis of certainty, saying,
"the United States' position has greater certainty because it offers
an objective method for delimiting intervening waters," namely,
the 45-degree test. After first hypothesizing that "Alaska's
definition... generally will produce uncertainty and the United
States' definition generally will not,""' the Master appears to
conclude after several pages of analysis that he does not believe
that this test has been established for use in this circumstance.
What the Special Master does not say, but surely it is implicit, is
that the "objective" 45-degree test proposed by the U.S. appears
not to provide the degree of certainty that he had hoped for.
Even though the Special Master returns to the 45-degree test
later in his Report when he appears to approve its use it for
identifying intervening waters between specific islands,"' his
comments above concerning the lack of precedential guidance
provided by prior Courts, coupled with the utter inability of the
parties to produce reliable identifications using this test,1 18 reflect
perhaps the Master's deep misgivings about establishing the 45-
degree test as part of an intervening waters analysis specifically or
as part of bay delimitation generally.
Since the Supreme Court does not cover this point in its
judgment in the Alaska case (nor in fact does the Court discuss
any of the so-called assimilation "factors" analyzed in the Master's
Report), it cannot be said that the 45-degree test or any other
extraneous test has been adopted by the Supreme Court as a
general rule for juridical bay delimitation. To date, the clearest
115. Id. at 160 (citing to U.S. v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary
Case) 469 U.S. 504, 519 (1985).
116. Master's Report at 154, 155.
117. Id. at 177.
118. Id. at 177-79.
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indication of the Supreme Court's attitude toward the use of
objective standards beyond those provided in Article 7 is that
revealed in the California Supplemental Decree cited above,1 19 i.e.,
that in the special circumstance where there is no pronounced
natural entrance point to an indentation, an objective test may be
used to create one.
This approach is most in keeping with the intent of the
drafters and the text of Article 7 of the 1958 Convention, which
was meant to simplify the rules on bays by the use of readily
understandable geographic terms, limited by the geometric
standard provided by the semi-circle test and the 24-mile closing
line rule. If correctly applied, no other so-called objective test is
needed to identify the waters of an indentation.
The Special Master articulates his third reason for adopting
the U.S. approach to defining intervening waters at point c. above,
i.e., that "Alaska's approach would make assimilation
substantially easier."120 In this one statement, the Master reveals,
perhaps unconsciously, the federal bias that underlies the whole of
federal/state maritime boundary litigation to date. When Master
Maggs worries that Alaska's approach might make assimilation
easier, the question that must be asked is, "Easier for whom?" The
answer, of course, is, "For Alaska." The larger question might be,
How did we get to the point that a Special Master in federal/state
maritime boundary litigation can make a supposedly neutral
choice between the arguments of the parties by openly stating that
he is choosing the one that will have the most negative effect on
one of those parties, in this case the coastal state? The answer
arguably lies embedded in the process alluded to briefly, supra, by
which the federal government established "official" U.S. baselines
which were then used as "objective" evidence in all of the
government's cases against the states.
Recall that shortly after the Court in the second California
case held that Article 7 of the 1958 Convention was to be the
applicable law in all federal/state cases establishing maritime
boundaries under the Submerged Lands Act,121 a federal
Interagency Baseline Committee was established to reset the
119. See supra note 109.
120. Id. at 158.
121. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 165 (1965).
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baselines around the coasts of the United States in light of the new
Convention. Dr. Hodgson and Dr. Alexander were then U.S. State
Department geographers. Both served on the Interagency Baseline
Committee with representatives from the Justice Department and
other executive agencies. After the new baselines had been drawn,
Dr. Hodgson was engaged as an expert by the United States in
many of the government's cases against the states.
Dr. Hodgson was well aware that the federal government had
existing and pending cases against the states and that his expert
opinion would be used in these cases. As noted earlier, 12 2 in his
deposition in the Alaska Cook Inlet case, 12 3 Dr. Hodgson was asked
whether the work of the Baseline Committee had been undertaken
because, as reflected in an intergovernmental memo, the federal
government "has its lawsuits against most of the coastal states?"
Dr. Hodgson eventually replied, "I would say that it was in part
because of the litigation existing and pending."12 4 In the same
deposition, Dr. Hodgson acknowledged that the Committee had
knowledge, when determining the baselines for Cook Inlet, Alaska,
of the pending litigation between the state and the federal
government relative to the status of Cook Inlet as inland waters,
and that he himself did know of the litigation by the time the
Committee's discussion of Cook Inlet began. 12 5
In further questioning, Dr. Hodgson was asked if he agreed
with a memorandum written by Dr. Chapman of the Fish and
Wildlife Department, to Dr. Boggs (Dr. Hodgson's predecessor as
U.S. Geographer), which expressed this concern: "There may be
some question of propriety for a Federal Agency to publish such an
overprinted line with a case turning upon the position of this line
now in litigation with the Government as a party to this suit."12 6
Dr. Hodgson replied that he did not know if there was a
question of legal impropriety involved, but he believed there would
be no bureaucratic impropriety in the "production of the charts and
their ultimate use by the Justice Department in this suit," adding
122. See supra text accompanying note 36.
123. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975); supp. materials vol. 1:
appendix, no. 73-1888, Testimony of Dr. Robert Hodgson, Geographer,
Department of State (October Term, 1973).
124. Id. at 301.
125. Id. at 310.
126. Id. at 311-12.
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the caveat that "[I]f we were to produce a series of charts
specifically for that purpose, then there might be a question of
impropriety." 127 Having already acknowledged that the purpose for
producing the charts was in part to create evidence for use in
existing and pending litigation against the states, one has to
assume that the word "specifically" is the key word in this passage
from Dr. Hodgson's testimony.
My purpose in setting forth a portion of the record in some
detail here is not to impugn the integrity of Dr. Hodgson or any
other of the several geographic experts involved in the work of the
Baseline Committee. They were doing the job they had been asked
to do based on their considerable geographic expertise. Having
explored baseline delimitation in their prior work, it probably
seemed quite appropriate to suggest theories developed therein,
such as the 45-degree test, as an aid to interpreting Article 7 of the
1958 Convention. Of course, these should never have been
recommended for general use in bay determinations in which
natural entrance points are readily definable; but I assume the
good faith of these geographic experts, even though they were well
aware of the federal litigation against the states in which many of
their suggested baselines would come to be seen as "official" and
their various testimonies considered those of "objective" experts.
Rather, it is my intention to make clear that official baselines
affecting state interests were drawn by federal officials with an eye
toward pending federal-state maritime boundary cases. These
federal officials, including the federal prosecutors in every case
against the states, felt free to import a host of extra-conventional
theories and tests to create baselines that to say the least took the
federal position in pending cases very much to heart. Many of the
later missteps in statutory interpretation had their genesis in this
intense federal workshop because the use of outdated terms
embedded in the writings and the conceptual constructs of
Committee members created the erroneous impression that
continued usage of those terms and concepts was appropriate in
interpreting the new language of Article 7.
One example may suffice to illustrate the enormity of the
mischief caused by an ad hoc group supposedly tasked with
127. Id. at 313. See also WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 223-25 and notes 176-79,
for a more complete rendering of portions of these proceedings.
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interpreting the new Convention which in reality overrode that
language while creating baselines for use in federal/state maritime
cases. By utilizing the outdated terms "headlands" and "mainland"
as acceptable surrogates for "natural entrance points" and "coasts,"
the much more flexible and inclusive terms chosen by the drafters,
the work of the Baseline Committee led directly to the language in
the Louisiana case and others which speaks of bays being
indentations "into the mainland" whose "headlands" are located on
mainland points on either side. Once this error was "written in" to
the language of Article 7, then any feature not matching this
paradigm must present a special circumstance NOT contemplated
by the drafters, thus necessitating special rules.
Coastal features such as islands (which by definition cannot
be "mainland" nor serve as "mainland headlands" but can serve as
''natural entrance points" which create more than one mouth into a
coastal indentation) must therefore be seen as "exceptional," even
though the drafters had specifically acknowledged the importance
of such naturally- and frequently-occurring coastal configurations
in the actual text of Article 7(3) and included them within the
measurement rules in the text of Article 7(4). By ignoring the text
and the commentaries, the Baseline Committee's work led to the
"special circumstances" approach now firmly embedded in
domestic juridical bay precedents and to the development of a host
of special tests and factors which must be analyzed in order to
resolve each supposedly "exceptional" case. The most harmful of
these special tests must surely be the "assimilation of islands to
the mainland test" which purports to resolve the key issue of when
islands can be considered a "part of the mainland," a question
which could never be posed under the clear language of Article 7 in
which the term "mainland" never appears.
In one of the most telling sections of the U.S. Brief on Count
II (juridical bays) in the Alaska case, the government
acknowledges that "[T]he Convention makes no express provision
for assimilating islands to the mainland."12 8 This gap might have
been seen as an indication that no such inquiry was ever intended
or required. But by the time of the Alaska case, the non-test had
become a fixture of the Court's special circumstances approach.
128. Motion of the United States for Partial Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in support of Motion on Count II of the Amended Complaint, at 5,
July 24, 2002.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
The government's brief continues: "[T]he Supreme Court has ruled
that assimilation is permissible in exceptional circumstances. The
Court first recognized that possibility in the Louisiana case,"1 29
and the brief leaves no doubt as to how this extra-conventional test
came into being nor as to the basis upon which past Special
Masters and Courts have relied for their decisions:
In past original actions raising similar issues, the
Supreme Court's special masters... have heard
testimony from international law experts and
geographers on the highly specialized principles that
govern the application of Article 7 of the Convention.1 30
The government's brief also makes clear that the non-test of
assimilation has now become a threshold requirement that must
be satisfied before moving forward in a juridical bay analysis:
[T]he United States urges that the islands do not
qualify, as a matter of law, for assimilation to the
mainland because they lack even the threshold
requirement of the necessary relationship to the
mainland... Accordingly... there would be no occasion
to reach the further inquiry of whether the resulting
configurations of the islands and the mainland satisfy
the other requirements for creating juridical bays by
assimilation. 131
The Special Master later acknowledges the threshold nature
of the test when he notes that the government has asked him not
to undertake an Article 7 analysis "if Alaska's assimilation theory
fails." Nonetheless, he proceeds to address the Article 7 issues,
which should have been the very heart of his analysis, for the
"convenience of the [Supreme] Court," which "may disagree with
some or all of the Special Master's recommendations with respect
to assimilation or may find the requirements of Article 7 easier to
address." 132
In sum, the creation of the assimilation of islands to the
129. 394 U.S. at 60-66.
130. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Master's Report at 198.
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mainland test has caused the regime for bay-related islands
specifically designed by the drafters to benefit coastal states
worldwide to be "ignored" in U.S. federal/state conflicts. The clear
text of Article 7(3) and (4) has been overridden by tests proposed
by attorneys and geographic experts, many of whom worked for the
government on these cases, vitiating the drafters' intent. Sadly,
one cannot assume the same good faith on the part of Justice
Department officials as has been assumed for State Department
geographers above. As noted previously by this author:
When one reflects on the fact that the federal prosecutor
on all the major federal-state cases... sat regularly on
the Baseline Committee, having major input in baseline
decisions, the question of propriety cannot easily be
brushed aside. When one reflects further on the probable
impact of "official baseline charts" as evidence in these
cases, one fears for the concept of the Federal
Government as a state trustee.133
Whether the process described above was tainted with bias or
impropriety, or has simply led to a cascade of unfairness over the
years, it cannot be denied that in every case Special Masters and
the Court have relied on baseline charts drawn by a federal
committee well aware of pending cases against the States, and
introduced as evidence by the federal government as
presumptively official. The frequent reference to the "very
influential" and "highly regarded" work of Hodgson, Alexander and
other objective experts are further illustrations of a federal
advantage that has run through federal/state maritime boundary
litigation to this day. Nor is this advantage disproved by the fact
that some cases have eventually been decided in favor of the
states, because the special circumstances approach adopted by the
Court, with its baggage of special "tests" and related "factors" and
high costs in tow, has made it increasingly difficult for coastal
states to prevail in their inland waters claims. That the Special
Master can state openly that he is choosing the approach of the
federal government because to choose otherwise would make it
easier for Alaska to prevail on their assimilation claim simply
reinforces the charge.
133. WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 225.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
b. OTHER ASSIMILATION FACTORS
Other factors deemed essential to the "assimilation of islands"
analysis by the Special Master can be roughly categorized as those
pertaining to the waters of the indentation (the depth, width, and
utility of the intervening waters; the effect of tides and of dredging
and improvements on defining intervening waters; and the
distance between shores) and those pertaining to the land [the
configuration of the coast; the size, shape and population of the
island(s); the social and economic conditions of the island(s); and
the geologic origin of the island(s)]. A brief critique of the Master's
analysis in each category will suffice to illustrate some of the key
misconceptions in play.
The Waters: Moving on to his assimilation analysis per se,
the Special Master uses by-now familiar case precedentl3 4 to
establish that "assimilation depends on the depth, width, and
utility of the intervening waters." Only the utility of the waters
has any relevance to juridical bay delimitation, and this element is
proven, not by measurements of any kind, but by the actual
usage of the waters. There is no need for width and depth
calculations, either in and of themselves or as surrogates for utility
if that is their purpose.
From earliest times, there has been general agreement that
bays could be internalized by coastal states because doing so did
not interfere with normal shipping lanes that typically by-pass bay
entrances entirely. Unless a ship had some business within the
indentation, e.g., entering the indentation for the purpose of
making and/or taking deliveries of goods, or plying the waters for
local travel and trade between internal locations, or making an
authorized military visit to an inland port, there was no reason for
a ship to enter these protected waters without the permission of
the coastal state.
Even though Courts have sometimes spoken about the
shallow depth of the water of a given indentation as indicating
that the waters will most likely not be used for any but local
purposes, that does not make the depth of an indentation relevant
on its own. For example, you may have waters that are very
shallow, as in Mississippi/Alabama Sound or in parts of the
134. Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 66; Rhode Island and New York
Boundary Case, 469 U.S. at 516.
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Florida Keys, and therefore not likely to be used for
interstate/international navigation. But you may also have very
deep waters, such as those in parts of the Alexander Archipelago,
which are also unlikely to be used except for reaching inland ports
due to the fact that the closely interconnected nature of the islands
makes travel difficult and slow and unattractive to any but those
leaving or entering those ports. Both of these kinds of waters pass
the utility test, regardless of their depth, because their factual use
is consistent with principles which allow the enclosure of internal
waters.
Under current bay jurisprudence, however, the measurement
of the depth and width of an indentation is thought to be required
even if no one is clear about how to use the numbers to make their
respective cases. In the Alaska case, there is a good deal of
confusion among the parties and the Master himself concerning
the difference between assessing the navigability of the waters in
question (which is irrelevant, because local traffic and interstate
traffic both ply "navigable" waters by definition) and their utility.
The analysis is greatly complicated by the addition of yet two more
factors, the effect of the tides and the effect of dredging and
improvements, which are likewise irrelevant because their stated
effects are also on the navigability of the waters, rather than their
utility.135
Observing that as the tide rises, the waters become deeper,
wider and more useful for navigation (with the not-surprisingly
opposite effect when it falls), neither the Special Master nor the
parties are able to explain how these differences matter, even in
the case of Southeast Alaska which has "large tidal ranges."136 A
lively if bizarre discussion ensues about the appropriate tidal
datum to use for measuring the width and the depth of the waters;
but again, this appears to be related to navigability rather than
use. Even though the Master states that tides are important in
assessing utility, he does not explain why. Finally, Master Maggs
appears to agree that only the utility of the waters is relevant and,
moreover, attempting to "take [all three factors] into account. . .
would make the assimilation inquiry almost unmanageable." 3 7
135. Master's Report at 165-66.
136. Id. at 166.
137. Id. at 167.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
The same critique can be made of the Master's analysis of the
effect of dredging and improvements, which also confuses
navigability with utility. In looking at specific waterways later in
the Report, the Special Master "concludes that the depth and
utility of the very deep and easily navigable portions of Keku
Strait weigh more heavily against assimilation than the shallow
and less navigable portions of Rocky Pass."1 3 8 But the question to
be asked in each case is, "Navigable by whom and for what
purpose?" While it is certainly the case that dredging and other
improvements, such as those made in Rocky Pass, can deepen and
improve the navigability of the waters, that is not the correct test.
Rocky Pass, even if not improved and made more navigable, would
be enclosable as internal waters. The deeply navigable Keku Strait
would also be enclosable as internal waters because the use of the
waters is in keeping with international principles favoring their
enclosure. This analysis has been taken far off course, possibly
because the assimilation test causes each Special Master to take a
diversion in favor of federal interests or perhaps because there is
widespread confusion about the proper assessment of the utility of
the waters of an indentation. Assuming it to be the latter, a short
review of fundamentals may prove helpful.
The utility of the waters, as noted, is highly relevant to bay
delimitation, but it is to be assessed factually, based on the actual
usage of the waters in question. Utility is synonymous with use. A
quick investigation into the actual uses by ships of the waters of a
claimed indentation will reveal their utility without onerous
measurement requirements. Usage to and from points within an
indentation, regardless of the width, navigability, or depth of the
waters or their improved or unimproved state, or even the size and
draft of the users' ships, will point toward a use compatible with
the fundamental policies underlying bay enclosure. Normal
shipping lanes used by ships engaged in point-to-point interstate/
international trade and other types of "innocent passage" would
not be enclosable because those uses are compatible with the
policies favoring freedom of the seas rather than exclusive use by
coastal states.
This principle is widely acknowledged, but the application of
principle to fact often reveals confusion as to how the various uses
138. Id. at 181.
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are to be categorized. In several sections of his report, the Master
points towards uses that he appears to see as interstate or
international when in fact they are internal in nature because they
involve the passage of ships to and from inland ports of the
Archipelago. For example, he states that Wrangell Narrows is part
of "the regular route taken by vessels running to all southeastern
Alaska points from the ports on the Pacific coast of the United
States and Canada."139 But it doesn't matter where the vessels
have come from. It matters where they are going (e.g., to points in
Southeastern Alaska in general or to points within the
Archipelago) and for what purpose.
The Master tells us that the waters are used by ships
carrying cargo (more likely than not involving points within the
Archipelago), and by the Alaska Steamship Company and the
Pacific Steamship Company carrying passengers (also, more likely
than not involving internal points). Moreover, the traffic is said to
include "cruise ships, state ferries, barges, and freight boats
carrying lumber products, petroleum products, fish and fish
products, provisions and general cargo,"14 0 all uses which the
Master appears to see as inconsistent with internalization but
which in fact have the high likelihood of involving shipping
between inland points themselves or shipping to or from points
within the Archipelago and the sea.
Of course, these factual determinations will need to be made
in each case, but they must be based on actual usage, not the type
of cargo or size of ship or the width and depth of an indentation.
There is no need for making guesses based on surrogate
measurements when the facts are so easily determined. It could
not be clearer that a ship leaving Seattle carrying cargo bound for
a Canadian or Russian port, or even one bound for an Alaskan port
not within the Alexander Archipelago, will not be entering the
waters of the Archipelago but rather will be "passing by" on its
voyage.
139. Master's Report at 183.
140. Id. It should be noted that the same confusion between the use and
navigability of inland waters is to be found in the Master's analysis of the historic
bay issue, where waters are consistently described as heavily trafficked even
though the uses of the waters cut in favor of consistent internal use by ships of
the coastal state and others, and treaty-authorized vessels from other nations.
[Vol. 846
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
The Land: The Master's analysis of special factors related to
the land forms themselves, i.e., the configuration of the coast, the
size of an island, the social and economic conditions on the islands
and the geographic origin of the island(s), suffers from the same
conceptual maladies discussed above. It is almost as if a virus, let's
call it the "assimilation virus," infected the body of juridical bay
jurisprudence early on and, never having been detected and
treated properly, has metastasized so widely throughout the
system that it is now almost surely incurable. We no longer
question the necessity of pursuing diagnostic tests designed to
assess the various special factors because they have become
accepted parts of the differential diagnosis, the best practices if
you will for all those wanting to establish credible careers. Not to
over-use the metaphor, but as in well-known medical contexts
where the cause of cholera or plague outbreaks is sought in factors
as widely diverse as the socio-economic status of the victims, the
ethers arising from a nearby river, or the will of God, many of the
best practitioners spend years testing irrelevancies before the
cause is detected in human effluent or rodent feces, and correct
analytical procedures are established.
In the case of bay determination, we are similarly befuddled.
To take the first of the land-related factors above, in assessing an
island's relationship to the configuration of the coast we no longer
ask why this is important to our bay diagnosis. It must be, because
so many good practitioners agree that it is, and it has been
included in so much of our "medical" literature, i.e., federal/state
cases decided under the original jurisdiction of the Court.
By the time of the Alaska case, neither Alaska nor the U.S.
would dare to question the appropriateness of the assimilation of
islands to the mainland test itself, nor the relevance of considering
the configuration of the coast in relation to the island(s) as central
to resolving the assimilation issue. Remarkably, even the parties
themselves agree that an island's relationship to the configuration
or curvature of the coast is most conducive to assimilation when
the "island is separated from the mainland or another island by a
'riverine' channel of water."'4 1 Perhaps most remarkable, the
parties also agree that, having established yet another extra-
conventional term, another extra-conventional test should be used
141. Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
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for determining when a channel has this so-called riverine
character, i.e., that "for assimilation to occur, a channel of
intervening waters should have a length-to-width ratio of three-to-
one." 142
Clearly, the virus has now spread to the point that in trying
to locate the intervening waters between the mainland [sic] and
the islands, in order to define the island's relationship to the
configuration of the coast, in order to satisfy the assimilation to
the mainland requirement, neither party questions the need to
define a feature as non-essential as a "riverine channel." Instead,
the parties enthusiastically adopt the new so-called test and only
disagree at the margins where the application of tests to facts is in
dispute. It is no longer surprising to find that, as the virus goes
undetected in case after case, both parties, even the moving state,
run the risk of adopting analyses that may cut against their own
interests.
As more cases involving islands come before the Court over
time (and almost all bay cases do involve islands), other
assimilation queries are developed in order access the geographical
relationship between the specific land forms involved in each case:
Does the island alter the "natural configuration of the mainland
coast" too much? Does the island lie in general conformity with the
configuration of the coast or does it "jut out" from the mainland in
an unseemly way? Is the distance between the island and the
mainland too great? Is the "size of the island" so large that it
"dwarfs" the size of the "mainland" indentation? Or is the island
more or less able to be assimilated if it is too small?
Still more questions are posed based on principles used to
assess islands in other Convention contexts, such as straight
baseline claims (Are there many or few "social and economic
connections" 14 3 between the inhabitants of the islands and the
mainland and which condition matters more? Can the islands be
seen as "fringing" the coast?) or claims to the continental shelf (Do
the islands and the mainland share a common geological history?
142. Id. See also Hodgson and Alexander supra note 107, at 20.
143. Article 4(7) of the 1958 Convention reads as follows: Where the method of
straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account may be taken, in
determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region
concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by long
usage. See "Fringing Islands" language, supra note 39, Article 4 (1).
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
Is the continental shelf a continuation of the mainland?) Such tests
were never meant to be applied in a juridical bay context. However
due to the inability to settle on a Article 7-based standard for bay
determinations, they often are. Before long, it is hard to see a way
back to Article 7 and the simplified process for bay determination
that the drafters intended.
Needless to say, the language of Article 7 does not require the
laborious processes described above. Islands are natural features
of coasts and create natural entrance points into coastal
indentations, sometimes even creating the indentations
themselves. The rules established under Article 7, in particular
the geographic limitations imposed by the semi-circle test and the
twenty-four mile closing line rules, were designed to address all of
the historic concerns about excessive bay claims in a much more
simplified, efficient, and neutral way. In fact, that was the very
purpose of the codification exercise that resulted in both the 1958
and the 1982 Conventions - to eliminate to the extent possible the
differences between states in delimiting their coastal indentations.
Sadly, even when Special Masters and the Court purport to apply
the Article 7 rules, they are too overburdened by past
misconceptions to appreciate the benefits that might flow from
applying Article 7 as the Convention drafters intended.
2. THE MASTER'S JURIDICAL BAY ANALYSIS UNDER ARTICLE 7
Even when Special Master Maggs begins his structural
analysis of the actual text of the Convention, 1 44 his continued use
of outdated terms leads to the implication that there is uncertainty
concerning the proper relationship between the geographic and
geometic criteria set forth in Article 7(2) and the measurement
rules set forth in Article 7(3), in particular those related to islands.
This has a deleterious effect on all parts of the Master's analysis in
which the mouth of an indentation must be measured for various
purposes. The first sentence of Article 7(2) requires that the width
of the mouth be compared with the depth of the indentation's
penetration inland in order to assess the landlocked character of
the indentation. The second sentence of Article 7(2) requires that
the width of the mouth be measured in order to determine the
length of the line that will be used as the diameter of the semi-
144. Master's Report at 198-226.
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circle, the area of which must then be compared with the area of
the indentation itself in applying the semi-circle test.
The legislative history of the development of these sections,
based on the consistent historical treatment of these bay-related
islands over hundreds of years, is very illuminating but cannot be
covered in detail here due to space restrictions.14 5 In brief,
however, Article 7(2) represents an uneasy marriage between
states that wanted to retain traditional geographic criteria, i.e.,
"landlocked" and "well-marked," and those who, since the time of
the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, had demanded more
easily applied geometric criteria, such as that imposed by the semi-
circle test. In their 1953 and 1954 drafts of Article 7(2), the
drafters took a purely geometric approach, establishing only the
semi-circle test for bay determination. The replies of governments,
however, indicated a strong desire on the part of a few states to
retain the more familiar geographic terms. The 1955 and 1956
drafts and the final language of 7(2) reflect a compromise. The first
sentence of Article 7(2) retains the geographic criteria but the
second sentence makes clear that no indentation, however
landlocked (or well-marked), can be considered a juridical bay
unless it also passes the semi-circle test.
Disagreement has persisted since 1958 as to whether the two
sentences of Article 7(2) impose two separate empirical tests or
whether an indentation that passes the semi-circle test is by
definition landlocked, the latter being the view of the majority of
commentators today, primarily because it is difficult to find a bay
worldwide that passes the semi-circle test and yet fails to be
landlocked as well."' The Louisiana Court, however, held in favor
of the minority view, i.e., that Article 7(2) establishes in its two
sentences, two separate empirical tests.14 7
145. See WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 199-259 for a detailed discussion of this
history.
146. Although this author adopted the former view when The Juridical Bay was
published in 1987, I have changed my opinion due to better charting by all states,
more advanced navigation aids, and, most importantly, the lack of real-life
examples in which a given bay, having passed the semi-circle test, fails to pass
the geographic criteria as well. Nonetheless, the first sentence remains; and until
the Court agrees with the majority that the first sentence of Article 7(2) is made
redundant by the semi-circle test, the landlocked (and well-marked) requirements
will have to be resolved in each federal/state case.
147. 394 U.S. at 54.
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The Louisiana Court's approach has complicated the analysis
in subsequent juridical bay cases, of course, because so many more
criteria must perforce be met to establish a bay. But one of the
major disagreements in this case did not center on the relationship
between the two sentences of Article 7(2). Rather, Alaska and the
federal government strongly disagreed about how to measure the
width of the mouth of the indentation under the measurement
rules for islands established in Article 7(3).
Alaska argued that the general and mandatory measurement
rule contained in the first sentence of 7(3), "[F]or the purpose of
measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between the
low-water mark around the shore of an indentation and a line
joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points,"
applied equally to both sentences of 7(2), whether the indentation
in question is a single-mouthed or a multi-mouthed bay. This is an
appropriate interpretation of the statute, in that the section begins
with a general statement, "[flor the purpose of measurement. . ."
indicating that the first sentence is to be applied when
determining both the landlocked (and well-marked) character of
the indentation and when applying the semi-circle test. The first
sentence of 7(3) also ends with language of general application,
indicating that when measuring the extent of the opening for any
"purpose," one must deal with a line "joining the low-water marks
of its natural entrance points." We know from our detailed analysis
of the legislative history14 8 that the drafters considered islands to
be normal coastline features and that islands that create more
than one mouth into an indentation also create multiple natural
entrance points. Thus, the whole of the first sentence of 7(3)
applies with equal force when undertaking the measurement tasks
set forth in 7(2).
The United States argued that the second sentence of Article
7(3) cannot be applied in any situation except when establishing a
diameter line for purposes of the semi-circle test and, thus, only
applies to the second sentence of 7(2). The problem with this
inappropriate statutory construction is that we are then left with
no standard whatsoever for measuring the opening for the purpose
of applying the landlocked and well-marked requirements. The
drafters could not have intended such a gap because, as they
148. See, in general, supra PART II.
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observed in every draft of Article 7, islands which create separate
mouths into an indentation tend to lock that indentation even
more firmly to the interests of the coastal state and the presence of
islands creates an indentation that is both more landlocked and
well-marked than one whose entrance faces the open sea. 1 4 9
The second sentence of Article 7(3) does not establish a rule
that can only be used when applying the semi-circle test. Rather, it
was meant to clarify the general rule, establishing a mandatory
methodology for measuring the width of a multi-mouthed
indentation, i.e., the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the
different mouths, (rather than the length of a line extending from
mainland headland [sic] to mainland headland), is to be used. 150
The language in the 1956 draft reads almost identically: "If a bay
has more than one mouth, this semi-circle shall be drawn on a
line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the different
mouths," language that is consistent with the final Convention
text. 151
Despite this mandatory language, the Special Master rejected
Alaska's argument that both the general rule and the more specific
clarification of that rule must be applied equally to both sentences
of 7(2) and, instead, adopts the position taken by the United
States, that the clarification can only be used when applying the
semi-circle test. In other words, despite the clear intent of the
drafters as to the landlocked and well-marked character of multi-
mouthed bays, the government argues that when we are applying
the landlocked and well-marked requirements in the first sentence
of 7(2), we need an all new rule.
It is hard to read Article 7(3) as not applying to the semi-
circle test since the term is specifically referenced therein. 152 That
does not mean, however, that the same rule cannot be applied
149. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
150. [1955] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 36.
151. [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 268-69 (emphasis added). The final text of
Article 7(3) reads as follows: For the purpose of measurement, the area of an
indentation is that lying between the low-water mark around the shore of the
indentation and a line joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points.
Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one
mouth, the semicircle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the
lengths of the lines across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation
shall be included as if they were part of the water area of the indentation.
152. See id.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
when comparing the width of the indentation with the depth of its
penetration inland under the first sentence of 7(2). For that sole
purpose, the Master adopts the U.S. approach, which requires
measuring the total distance from mainland headland to mainland
headland without subtracting the length of the various islands
because "the text of Article 7 better supports the United States'
view."153
The text of Article 7, however, contains no language
whatsoever that would support the United States' view, nor does
the legislative history which makes clear that only one
methodology for measuring the opening(s) of an indentation was
ever expressly mentioned by the drafters. The Master suggests at
several points that "nothing in Article 7 expressly says how to
make this width/depth comparison when islands lie in the
mouth"1 54 of an indentation, a statement that seems at odds with
all rules of treaty interpretation. Even if one truly believed that
the measurement rule for multi-mouthed bays only applies when
performing the semi-circle test established in the second sentence
of 7(2), you would surely reason that the methodology that is
expressly mentioned could and should be used first for other
purposes before moving off-text and designing an entirely new rule
based on out-dated terminology expressly rejected by the drafters,
i.e., that the mouth of the indentation should be measured from
mainland headland to mainland headland ignoring, for purposes of
applying the landlocked requirement, all islands lying "in the
mouth."
It may well be that the use of the modifying phrase "in the
mouth" to describe bay-related islands led the Special Master to
accept, without convincing analysis, the measurement test
advocated by the federal government. Certainly the same phrase is
repeated frequently in the Report. 155 As discussed above, this
language concept error, originally made by geographic experts
(some of whom later served on the Baseline Committee) has come
into wide use, often accompanied by a visual illustration which
shows islands lying neatly "in the mouth" of a bay along a straight
line drawn between two "mainland" entrance points. This visual
misrepresentation has of course embedded the language concept
153. Master's Report at 202.
154. Id. at 203.
155. Id. at 203 and 204.
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error even more firmly into later works and cases that speak of a
bay as having "a" mouth and islands as lying "in the mouth" of the
bay. The Special Master utilizes the same erroneous language in
adopting a new rule for measuring the mouth of an indentation
under the first sentence of 7(2).
When measuring the penetration of an indentation
using the longest straight line method, the longest
straight line must begin on the headland to headland
line across the mouth of the bay. Although a bay may
have entrance points that lie seaward of this line when
islands lie in the mouth of the bay, the Special Master
previously has concluded that islands should be ignored
when measuring the indentation's physical
characteristics for the purposes of article 7(2)'s first
sentence. 156
The original illustration is usually credited to Hodgson
and Alexander,15 7 but it has been replicated in the work of
many commentators, including Beazley.15 8 Westerman also
uses the chart,1 59 but only to observe that neither geographic
reality nor the language of Article 7 supports such a reading.
156. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
157. Supra note 107, at 16.
158. Supra note 106, at 24.
159. WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 129, figure 11, which is reproduced supra at
text accompanying note 112.
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Figure 3. Islands misconceived as "in the mouth of the
bay."
Nature has not seen fit to place islands in a straight line in
the "mouth" of bays, and Article 7 sets forth no location
requirements whatsoever for islands which create multiple mouths
into bays.160 In that circumstance, it is obvious that an indentation
will have at least two mouths, and perhaps more, with "mouths"
being defined factually as openings or entrances into the
indentation which are used by vessels to enter the enclosed waters.
Each of these multiple entrances must be measured using the
general and mandatory measurement rule contained in Article
7(3), i.e., lines must be drawn between the natural entrance points
of the indentation. Unfortunately, the original conceptual error
has become so engrained in the jurisprudence of bay delimitation
160. Id. at 128. The drafters rely on the semi-circle test and the 24-mile closing
line rule to ensure that islands creating separate entrances to an indentation do
not stray too far from the shore.
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that Special Master Maggs can even overlook the mandatory
language from the Louisiana Court, that "lines across the various
mouths are to be the baselines for all purposes,"1' as only
referring to the drawing of closing lines after already determining
that a bay exists. 16 2 Here, the Master ignores the fact that the
landlocked and semi-circle tests are two of the ways in which we
make that determination. Article 7(3) measurement rules must be
applied first before the bay determination can be made. The
Master's questionable treaty interpretation can perhaps be best
understood from his observation that the difference between the
measurement methodologies advocated by the two parties
"substantially affects the juridical bay analysis. . . [making it]
easier to satisfy the requirements of article 7(2)'s first sentence." 163
Once again: Easier for whom?
The second basic error in the Special Master's textual
analysis of Article 7 is his continued over-use of special tests when
none are needed. To use but one example here, in measuring the
bay's "penetration" in order to analyze the "proportion" and
"landlocked" language in Article 7(2),164 the Master adopts the
"longest straight line method" (to which, remarkably, both Alaska
and the government agree) in calculating the width-depth ratio. As
with the special 45-degree test, the 3-to-i ratio test, the bisector of
the angle test, and others discussed above, the longest straight line
test was recommended in Hodgson and Alexander's "influential"
paper. 16 5 Despite their agreement on which test to use, the parties
dispute where the longest straight line may start and where it may
end,'6 6 Alaska arguing that it may start at the most distant
entrance point leading into the bay and the United States
countering that the line must begin on a line drawn from
"headland to headland across the bay's mouth." After substantial
briefing by both parties, supported by some of the most complex
mapping of alternative lines this author has ever seen,"' the
Special Master chooses the United States approach,
acknowledging however that neither side has cited authority for its
161. Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 55.
162. Master's Report at 204.
163. Id. at 202.
164. Id. at 205-14.
165. Hodgson, supra note 107, at 8-9 and fig. 3.
166. Master's Report at 206-08.
167. See Master's Report, Appendices E through L.
56 [Vol. 8
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
position.
In assessing the proportion of width to penetration inland to
apply the landlocked requirement, even more special tests are
proposed. Hodgson and Alexander recommended that "true-
landlocked conditions should require that the opening (of the bay)
be narrower than a principal lateral axis of the bay."168 Another
expert, Mitchell Strohl, suggested that a model bay would have a
penetration equal to its width. 6 These and other suggested
proportions are reminiscent of those proposed and rejected during*
the drafting process, the history of which the Master appears to be
familiar. Ignoring the measurement rules set forth in Article 7(3)
completely, he notes that Article 7(2) could have required more
definite measurement rules, but does not. He concludes, along the
lines of the Hodgson and Alexander test above, that the proportion
of penetration to width is a factor to consider, "the greater the
proportion, the more the waterway resembles a bay, and vice
versa." 1o
The tests put forward by the geographic experts above and
those adopted by Master Maggs contradict the precedent set in the
second California case where the Court held that Monterey Bay,
with a width of 19.24 miles and a penetration inland of only 9.2
miles, constituted a juridical bay. The Master rejects this very
clear precedent as a benchmark for future cases, saying that if the
Court had used the longest straight line method instead of the
maximum perpendicular line method (even though neither are
required nor preferred), the penetration of Monterey Bay would
exceed the width of its mouth.
The correct analysis of Article 7 does not require this kind of
complexity. The landlocked quality of a given indentation, with or
without islands that create different mouths into it, will usually be
obvious to the eye and require no special rules. Once proposed and
used, however, supposedly helpful mathematical tests tend to
proliferate and gain legitimacy to the point that not using a
particular measurement method can, as the Special Master
suggests above, arguably deprive a prior decision on Monterey Bay
of its present legitimacy. Would any of us seriously argue that
168. Supra note 107, at 8.
169. MITCHELL STROHL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 57 (Martinus Nijhoff
1963).
170. Master's Report at 211.
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Monterey Bay no longer should serve as a benchmark for future
bay cases?
We are in danger now of allowing such tests to overwhelm
good sense. Because they produce widely disparate results
depending on the interests of the parties, we may easily lose track
of the fundamental question being asked: Are the waters of this
indentation so closely related to coastal state interests that a
conclusion can be reached favoring those interests? Every
mathematical test or geographical factor currently being taken
into account in reaching the conclusion that an indentation is in
fact a bay is directly related to this basic inquiry. The presence of
islands that create separate mouths into an indentation ties that
indentation even more closely to coastal state interests, as the
drafters made clear.1 71
B. A CORRECTED JURIDICAL BAY ANALYSIS UNDER
ARTICLE 7
I conclude in advance that the Alexander Archipelago
qualifies as a juridical bay under Article 7 of the 1958 Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (UNCLOS, Article10).
I do not reach this conclusion using the same theory as that
employed by the State of Alaska, however, because the straight
jacket imposed on coastal states by prior federal/state litigation
forced Alaska to adopt the same skewed analytical framework that
is now required of both parties and finders of fact in these cases. I
would not re-configure the Archipelago into two primary juridical
bays, North Bay and South Bay, and two smaller juridical bays,
Cordova Bay and Sitka Sound. Even though the Special Master
recommended juridical bay status for the latter two indentations,
that designation was based on the use of the "assimilation of
islands to the mainland" test rather than on the language of the
Convention. I would also reject the method adopted by Alaska to
create North Bay and South Bay, i.e., visually removing all the
islands of the Archipelago save for a few that are said to create a
peninsula jutting out perpendicularly from the coast and forming
one so-called hypothetical bay on each side of the peninsula.
171. See [1955] 2 Y.B. Int'l. L. Comm'n, at 37: "Here, the Commission's intention
was to indicate that the presence of islands at the entrance to an indentation
links it more closely with the territory, which may justify some alteration of the
proportion between the length and the depth of the indentation."
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
Alaska made a legitimate case for enclosing both bays but was
forced to tailor their arguments to the so-called assimilation
theory, which I fundamentally oppose as being irrelevant under
the policies, principles and text of Article 7 and as having been
used to undermine the interests of coastal states in federal/state
maritime litigation.
Instead, I propose the following corrected analysis of the
Alexander Archipelago as one unified water area based exclusively
on the text and legislative history of Article 7.
Under Article 7(1), all of the coasts and all of the waters of
the Alexander Archipelago lie within the boundaries of the United
States. Nothing in the past alleged relationship of a part of the
coast to Canada, or changes related to glacial melting, are relevant
to this conclusion.
Under Article 7(2), sentence one, the Archipelago can be
deemed a well-marked indentation because the history of use of
the waters therein indicates that they have been and are presently
used by vessels either moving between points within the
Archipelago, or moving to internal points from regular shipping
lanes outside the Archipelago, or returning from internal points to
regular shipping lanes within the territorial sea. Vessels using the
regular lanes for interstate/international shipping or other
innocent passage-type purposes normally pass by the various
entrances to the Archipelago without entry, unless specifically
authorized. The internal nature of the waters is proven by their
actual use by vessels approaching the Archipelago from the sea or
moving among inland ports.
Ironically the Supreme Court quotes this author's own
work 7 2 to determine that the Alexander Archipelago does not
satisfy the well-marked requirement of Article 7(2). In paragraph
13 of the majority opinion, the Court states:
To qualify as a well-marked indention, a body of water
must possess physical features that would allow a
mariner looking at navigational charts that do not depict
bay closing lines nonetheless to perceive the bay's limits
[sic]and hence to avoid illegal encroachment into inland
waters. .. We have been referred to no authority which
172. WESTERMAN, THE JURIDICAL BAY, supra note 7, at 82-85.
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indicates that a mariner looking at an unadorned map of
the southeast Alaskan coast has ever discerned the
limits of Alaska's hypothetical bays. . . [These bays]
would not be discernible to the eye of the mariner. 17 3
In their attempt to satisfy the non-test of assimilation of
islands to the mainland, Alaska may have assisted the Court in
making this determination. The Court speaks of "Alaska's
hypothetical bays," referring not to the waters of the Archipelago
itself but rather to the two bays that were created by removing
most of the islands within the Archipelago visually from maps and
creating two "hypothetical" bays (North Bay and South Bay) on
either side of a peninsula (also made up of islands) that, as
described above, jutted out perpendicularly from the shore: 1 74
173. Alaska v. United States of America, 545 U.S. 75, 96 (2005).
174. See id., Appendix B.
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The Court says that these bays would not be discernible to
the eye of a mariner, and one would have to agree. This visual
representation removed the very characteristics that make the
Alexander Archipelago so clearly discernible from the open sea on
navigational charts, i.e., a complex water area made up of
thousands of interlocking, puzzle-shaped islands that seem to form
an almost impenetrable barrier between the waters of the
Archipelago and the territorial sea.
Respectfully the eye of the mariner is precisely the authority
that should have been consulted by the Court in establishing the
well-marked character of these waters. It is the use of these waters
by mariners engaged in local commerce between and among the
various islands (e.g., ferrying passengers and carrying cargo
between internal points, engaging in fishing and other resource
exploitation activities, conducting rescue and other fish and game
department tasks) or those arriving from the sea delivering goods
to internal points or bringing goods from those same points back
into the interstate/international shipping lanes, or ships in
distress seeking safe harbor, or military vessels visiting internal
ports with authorization, that have historically proven beyond
doubt that mariners approaching from the sea with only their
navigational charts can and have discerned the difference between
the waters of the Archipelago and those of the territorial sea. I
would venture to say that no mariner engaged in
international/interstate point-to-point trade or other kinds of
innocent passage has ever preferred to enter these waters, to pass
through the maze of thousands of interconnected islands and
passages, many impassable except in the summer months, instead
of proceeding along the regular. shipping lane on the seaward side,
just as the Court concedes is the case with mariners passing by
Long Island Sound unless they have a need to visit points within.
The Court misquotes this author as saying that the mariner
must perceive "the limits" of the bay, but that is not the test. In
the absence of official charts or external navigational aids such as
buoys or a lighthouse, a mariner must often rely on the two-
dimensional configuration of the indentation on his chart; and it
must be geographically obvious to the mariner that internal
waters are likely to be enclosed, even if no official boundary line
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has been recorded by the coastal state.1 75 No one who has ever seen
the configuration of the Alexander Archipelago, even on ordinary
maps, as illustrated below on Map 2, could fail to see that this is a
unique part of the coast that almost certainly will contain internal
waters. It is obvious even to the most inexperienced mariner that
this is not a strait through which a vessel can take a shortcut
between areas of high seas. The geographical obviousness of the
Alexander Archipelago as a well-marked indentation under Article
7(2) has been confirmed by the uses of its waters over time.
The Archipelago also contains "landlocked" waters. The
geography of the Archipelago is made up of thousands of closely
interconnected islands in a puzzle-like configuration separated by
narrow waters which in all but a few areas do not exceed six miles.
The landlocked character of these waters is obvious from the maps
alone without resort to extra-textual mathematical tests. If
additional confirmation is needed, this conclusion is also supported
by the use of the waters, as noted above. In addition, the
Archipelago is sparsely-inhabited and virtually devoid of roads,
bridges and other connections. Travel to, from, or between points
within the Archipelago for commerce or pleasure depends almost
entirely upon traversing these waters by boat or coastal air
service. The landlocked character of this immense water area is
further enhanced by the presence of islands which create separate
entrances into the Archipelago, and in a real sense block the
waters of the indentation from the open sea.
The same facts that confirm the well-marked and landlocked
character of the Archipelago also qualify it as more than a mere
curvature of the coast. Under Article 7(2), sentence two, the waters
of the Archipelago pass the semi-circle test because the area of the
waters of the indentation equals or exceeds the area of a semi-
circle drawn on a diameter line measured between the natural
entrance points of the indentation. In the case of multi-mouthed
indentations, this diameter line "shall be drawn on a line as long
as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different
mouths." Although a hydrographic measurement will be helpful in
close cases, there is no doubt in this case that the water area of the
indentation far exceeds the area of a semi-circle drawn on a line as
long as the sum total of the lines drawn between the islands and
175, WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 85.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
not including the length of the islands themselves. Although the
Master appears to think that the massive size of the water area
within the Archipelago cuts against its enclosure as a bay, a close
reading of Article 7(2) suggests the opposite. As long as the area of
the waters exceeds the area of the semi-circle, the most important
juridical threshold of Article 7 has been cleared, regardless of the
absolute size of the water area. This favorable areal comparison is
enhanced by last sentence of Article 7(3) which requires that we
treat the area of the islands within the indentation, i.e., landward
of the closing lines between the most seaward islands, as if they
were part of the water area itself.
Under Article 7(4) and Article 7(5), the entrance into the
Archipelago cannot be said to pass the 24-mile closing line rule per
se, due to the fact that the total distance between the islands that
create entrances into the indentation in fact exceeds 24 miles.
Rather than moving automatically to apply the rule in Article
7(5),"' it can be argued on the basis of the legislative history that
the presence of islands that create more than one mouth into an
indentation tends to link that indentation even more closely to the
interests of the coastal state, so that a certain leeway in
measurement rules may be permitted.
Supporting this reading, a longer closing line for multi-
mouthed bays was expressly envisaged by the drafters in an early
stage of their deliberations in 1953. The Committee of Experts,
having proposed that the "closing line across a (juridical) bay
should not exceed 10 miles in width," noted that "if the entrance of
a (juridical) bay is split up into a number of smaller openings by
various islands, closing lines may be drawn provided that none of
these lines exceed 5 miles in length - except one which may extend
up to 10 miles in length."17 Clearly then, a longer closing line was
contemplated for multi-mouthed bays than the 10-mile limit
proposed for bays with a single mouth. In addition, the drafters set
no limit on the number of entrances between islands that can be
176. Article 7(5) reads as follows: "Where the distance between the low-water
marks of the natural entrance points of a bay exceeds 24 nautical miles, a
straight baseline of 24 nautical miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a
manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible with a line of
that length."
177. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/90, at 25; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/77, at 10. The closing line
limit for single mouthed bays was increased to 24 miles in subsequent drafts and
now appears in the official text.
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measured. For example, assume that the presence of several
islands has created ten separate entrances into the indentation.
Assume further that nine of these entrances are five miles in
length and one is ten miles in length, which would meet the rule
proposed by the drafters. The sum total of the closing lines,
measuring only the distances between islands, would then be fifty-
five miles, a result apparently within the drafters' contemplation
at that time. Although this language did not become part of Article
7 per se, the drafters' idea that the presence of islands justified
some leeway in the closing line limit in Article 7(4) did survive in
subsequent drafts.
Based on this reading of the legislative history, my approach
would be that as long as the waters enclosed retain their
landlocked and well-marked character and pass the semi-circle
test, thus legitimizing our conclusion in favor of exclusive use,
there is no reason to disqualify the Archipelago as a juridical bay
on the basis of a somewhat larger than 24-mile sum total of
distances between the islands.
Finally, under Article 7(6), the Alexander Archipelago
qualifies as a juridical bay because the foregoing provisions of
Article 7 have not been applied to historic bays or in any case
where the straight baseline system provided for in Article 4
(UNCLOS, Article7) has been applied.
IV. THE NEED FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A U.S. POLICY ON THE
USE OF STRAIGHT BASELINES UNDER ARTICLE 4 OF THE
1958 CONVENTION.
As noted in detail in Part II above,"' Article 4 of the 1958
Geneva Convention was based on the I.C.J. Decision in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case in 1951 which established the right of
states with deeply indented coastlines or those with fringing
islands in the immediate vicinity to establish so-called straight
baselines at the outermost side of their coastal islands. The
skjaergaard or rocky rampart along the Norwegian coast was seen
as too complex to be delimited under the normal rule which
requires a baseline to be established at the low water line at every
point along the coast. The I.C.J. opinion was used almost verbatim
by the drafters of Article 4 in 1958 and was continued unchanged
178. See supra at text accompanying notes 38-41.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
in 1982 (UNCLOS, Article7), thereby concluding an almost 30 year
effort by coastal states to expand control over increasingly broad
areas of their contiguous high seas. 17
The United States has approved the use of the straight
baseline regime for third states as long as the guidelines of Article
4 are met but has elected not to exercise those same rights along
U.S. coasts, even though the coastline in many areas fits those
guidelines precisely. The second California case in 1965 approved
the federal policy, holding that coastal states such as California
could not internalize coastal waters under Article 4 unless or until
the federal policy changed. The government's possible motivations
for this decision are discussed in detail above. 18 0 Whatever might
have been the perceived wisdom of these decisions in the mid-
twentieth century, however, this policy is in urgent need of
reconsideration through a twenty-first century lens.
This author has attempted to utilize such a lens to critique
the Supreme Court's increasingly flawed jurisprudence under
Article 7 of the 1958 Convention (UNCLOS, Article1O). A second
article that will appear next year will use the same lens to criticize
the misguided executive branch policy on straight baselines under
Article 4 (UNCLOS, Article7), in detail. For now, various bases for
what is hoped will be the beginning of a more modern approach to
U.S. policy in this area can be briefly previewed here.
First, to put aside one of the government's historic concerns
regarding the use of Article 4, the claims of third states to straight
baselines have now become so ubiquitous that the possibility of
discouraging such claims by U.S. example and thereby preventing
their widespread and possibly unlawful use abroad, no longer
exists in any but the most academic context. U.S. policy can best
be effectuated in the international arena by insisting that claims
by third states be conservatively drawn under the clear language
of Article 4 and, as always, by engaging in a policy of "non-
acquiescence" in areas of the seas in which such claims are most
egregious.
179. See REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 25, at 19-37. The authors suggest
that the final victory in that struggle, i.e., the approval in 1982 of a 200-mile
exclusive economic zone for all coasts, rendered the piecemeal struggle of coastal
states to increase their exclusive control over their off-shore resources moot.
180. See supra Part II, Section B(2).
181. See REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 25, at 105-190 for original
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Second, denying coastal states the opportunity of enclosing
internal waters in situations where the geographic standards of
Article 4 are undeniably met has not only unfairly foreclosed a
legitimate option to states involved in federal/state litigation but
has unwisely foreclosed all the benefits that might have come to
the federal government from exercising their own rights under
Article 4. An undeniable benefit in terms of extended control over
ocean resources is enjoyed by states utilizing such claims, because
any seaward expansion of the baseline extends all other sea zones
as they move outward into the high seas. Even if the United States
were to conservatively enclose every part of the coastline which
meets the "deeply indented and cut into" or "fringed with islands
in the immediate vicinity" criteria, there would be, in addition to a
vastly more rational baseline, a small but not insignificant
increase in the amount of resources on and under the continental
shelf and in the exclusive economic zone that would automatically
become available for exploitation by U.S. entities. This possibly
modest benefit grows in comparison to the arguably non-existent
gain that the federal government earns from creating federal
"donut holes" in areas such as the Alexander Archipelago, where
small interstices among islands open up irregularly when the
distance between islands exceeds six miles. Complex mapping is
beyond the scope of the present article, but even a sketch map of
the Archipelago may quickly establish to the naked eye the very
limited benefit gained by the federal government by applying the
U.S. policy on straight baselines in this area.
hydrographic charts representing straight baseline claims by states in substantial
conformity with Article 4 (UNCLOS, Article7), such as Norway, Sweden, Finland,
Ireland, The Netherlands and parts of the Canadian Pacific Coast; and those that
violate Article 4, either because their non-conforming coasts fails to meet even the
threshold geographic criteria of Article 4, including Canada on the Atlantic Coast,
Australia, Cuba, Iceland, France, Vietnam, and numerous others whose coasts
are conforming in part but whose straight baselines claims are too excessive, such
as Myanmar, Kampuchea, Chili, South Korea, and others who claims
pathologically extend far beyond the parts of their coasts that could be
legitimately enclosed.
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4/
Y UKO E HR 11TORY
BRITISH
COLUMBiA
1. Looking at the informal map, the unremarkable line of the
western Alaskan coast of the United States proceeds southward to
the Canadian border as illustrated, until it reaches one notable
area where the coast appears to have become "fractured" into
small pieces that fit puzzle-like into a narrow rectangle seemingly
"carved out" of the Canadian landmass on the eastern side of the
Archipelago. Except for this unusual configuration, however, it is
obvious that the line and direction of the coastline facing the open
sea has not changed.
2. A map reader's sense that geological changes may have
produced this extraordinary shift in the character of the coastline
is verified by various sources summarized in the Special Master's
Report. These sources indicate that, in fact, the unusual
topography was formed by erosion of the complex fault patterns
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and contacts between different rock types, caused by both glacier
action and a later partial inundation, all of which has resulted in
the encroachment into the original land mass by a series of narrow
fiords, which provide the only substantial means of surface
transport throughout the Archipelago. 182 No one familiar with the
Article 4 geographical and geological criteria could deny that the
Archipelago is a paradigmatic Article 4 coastline, perhaps even
"super-paradigmatic" since there is no skaergaard extending
beyond the regular coast out into the open sea as in Norway and
states whose coasts meet the Article 4 standards.
3. If an unbroken baseline is drawn on the map above along
the seaward side of the islands, that line would reflect the location
of several historic renderings of the U.S. coastline, including those
drawn by U.S. geographers for the 1903 Alaska Boundary
Tribunal, an arbitration between the United States and Great
Britain, and those drawn by G. Etzel Pearcy, geographer of the
U.S. State Department, drawn in 1963.183 Inexplicably shifting
from a consistent historic rendering of this section of the Alaskan
coast, the Interagency Baseline Committee created new "official"
baselines in 1971184 which move inside the archipelago to encircle
each and every island and to mark every section of the coast. In
almost every case, the waters between the land points do not
exceed 6 nm in width, so that Alaskan internal waters in essence
overlap with each other in calculating the three mile limit from
each baseline granted to coastal states under the Submerged
Lands Act. In a few cases, however, the waters do exceed 6 nm in
width, creating almost insignificant "donut holes" representing
enclaves under so-called federal control but lying completely
within Alaskan waters. When one considers the map drawn by the
federal government (inserted as Appendix C of the decision as
noted), one is tempted to laugh at the absurdity of such a solution
182. See Master's Report, supra note 68, at 93-96. This section of the Report
concerns Alaska's claim to the archipelago as historic inland waters, a claim
which the Special Master dismisses, on arguably specious grounds. The purpose
of including this description of the geological changes in the geography of the land
mass is not to disprove that part of the Master's Report, but to demonstrate that
the archipelago is an example of a U.S. coastline that meets Article 4
requirements precisely.
183. See id. at 10. Another map showing the same lines can be found in
Appendix C of the Special Master's Report and in submissions by the State of
Alaska.
184. See id. at Appendix C.
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When Good Courts Go Wrong
(e.g., How will these "U.S." waters be marked, with colored die
perhaps or with a fence? Will the Alaskan pilotage rules for tug
boats expire at each donut hole, necessitating the creation of an all
new breed of federal tug boats which will ply only across these
diminutive spaces?) were it not for the fact that the Alaska case
has adopted these baselines, donut holes and all, as official.
4. No special hydrographic assistance is needed to see that
the federal policy in this area has resulted in very little benefit to
the federal government. In addition, it has in several instances led
to extremely negative, even absurd, results. For one, the
jurisdiction of the federal (and state) government under various
important federal environmental and conservation statutes, e.g.,
the Clean Water Act, ends at the three-mile limit of coastal state
control, leaving the federal government as proud owner of various
isolated federal enclaves which were quickly discovered by the
owners of large Glacier Bay cruise ships and others to be the
perfect location for dumping ship waste of all kinds. The problem
was later addressed by special act of Congress, but nothing could
be better proof of the old adage, "Be careful what you wish for."
It should also be noted on the benefits side that the federal
government could make excellent use of expanded control over
areas of internal, territorial and contiguous waters in the current
climate of increased security concerns. While we cannot halt
innocent passage through the territorial sea, we can nonetheless
develop more protective procedures within our internal waters and
close expanded areas of territorial sea and contiguous zone for
limited time periods and for limited purposes related to national
security, national public health and drug trafficking prevention.
Finally, while federal policy on straight baselines has
produced few measurable benefits for the government and has
instead produced in some instances very negative and non-sensical
outcomes, it also has unnecessarily inflated the costs in time and
money and human resources that the federal government must
incur in resolving any federal/state maritime dispute. The latest
Alaska case took years to prepare and resolve, utilizing the time
and talents of valuable public servants in both the federal and
state governments as well as numerous experts and special
witnesses hired by both sides, all to produce the hundreds of pages
of documents and develop the arguments necessary to the oral
phase of the case. All federal/state cases have become much more
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time-consuming and expensive than warranted. In a time of
limited resources on all sides, surely it is much more judicially
efficient to allow disputes to be resolved under those sections of the
Convention that most clearly fit the geographical facts presented
in each case. No one involved can deny that competing claims to
the Alexander Archipelago could much more easily have been
resolved if the parties and the fact finders were allowed to see it
from the beginning as an Article 4 (UNCLOS, Article 7) claim. If
the federal government could see its way clear to claim coastal
indentations that fit the Article 4 paradigm, those coastlines would
rarely if ever be subject to dispute. Yes, coastal states would
probably retain slightly larger areas of control behind the Article 4
baselines, if conservatively drawn. But the federal government
stands to benefit far more.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court approach to the establishment of
juridical bays along its coasts has become seriously flawed and
overly complicated and must be taken back, perhaps in the next
federal/state maritime boundary delimitation case, to its roots in
Article 7 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone. Several key conceptual and interpretative
missteps in the early cases have been exacerbated by the
establishment over time of special tests and analytical factors that
now place burdens of excessive time and cost on the federal
government and the states alike in bringing these cases before the
Court. Not only are these extra-conventional tests irrelevant to the
delimitation of bays, but their use has created a process that fails
to conform with the modernized and simplified approach
envisioned by the Convention drafters under Article 7. In addition,
the Court's special circumstances approach may conceal a serious
federal bias embedded in the litigation process which now
increasingly may affect the outcome of each case. Even the
possibility of such a bias is too important not to be addressed by
the Court.
The U.S. State Department and other relevant executive
agencies must reconsider the United States' policy on the
establishment of straight baselines along its coasts, most
importantly because, if conservatively applied, a new policy
permitting the use of Article 4 straight baselines may obviate the
[Vol. 870
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need to spend several years and hundreds of thousands of dollars
on each maritime boundary delimitation case as it comes before
the Court. This would be especially beneficial in cases involving
coastlines as complex as those of the Alexander Archipelago.
Current federal policy established in the 1960's may no longer be
reasonable nor in the best commercial, financial, and national
security interests of the United States.
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